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THE PRACTICE AND LEGALITY OF RENDITION
In January 2004, a Canadian citizen named Maher Arar filed a lawsuit in a Brooklyn District
Court1 against John Ashcroft, Tom Ridge, the directors of the FBI and INS, and other U.S. law
enforcement officials. The complaint alleged the following:
U.S. immigration officials stopped and questioned Arar when he was changing flights at John
F. Kennedy International Airport (“JFK airport”) on September 26, 2002.2 He was imprisoned in
solitary confinement for thirteen days, first at a facility near the airport and then at the Brooklyn
Metropolitan Detention Center, and interrogated about alleged ties to al-Qaeda.3 Arar was

initially denied access to counsel, and then his attorney was given misleading information about
his whereabouts.4 On October 8 immigration officials told him that he would be deported to

Syria, despite his repeated protests that he was a Canadian citizen5 and would be tortured if he
was sent to Damascus.6 Arar was driven in shackles to an airfield in New Jersey, and placed on a
private jet.7 The plane flew first to Washington, D.C., and then to Amman, Jordan.8 The U.S.

turned Arar over to Jordanian officials, who briefly interrogated and beat him and then
transferred him to Syrian custody.9
Arar was taken to a Syrian military intelligence facility called the Palestine Branch.10 For the
first twelve days of his imprisonment there, he was tortured and interrogated for eighteen hours a
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Plaintiff’s Complaint, Arar v. Ashcroft, filed Jan. 22, 2004. (E.D.N.Y.) (No. CV-00249).
Id. at ¶¶ 26 - 29.
Id. at ¶¶ 32 - 36.
Id. at ¶¶ 37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 46.
Arar was born in Syria, and emigrated to Canada in 1987 at the age of 17. Bruce Cheadle, Mystery Goes Unsolved; Canadians Unlikely to Ever
Learn Full Story of Syrian-Born Canadian Being Detained in Syria Prison: Expert, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Oct. 7, 2003, at A14. Syria does not
allow its citizens to renounce their citizenship, so Arar was technically a dual citizen of Canada and Syria.
6 Plaintiff’s Complaint, Arar v. Ashcroft, at ¶¶ 35, 40, 44, 47.
7 Id. at ¶ 49.
8 Id. at ¶¶ 49 - 50.
9 Id. at ¶ 50.
10 Id. at ¶ 50.
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day.11 Security officers “regularly beat him on the palms, hips, and lower back, using a two-inch thick
electrical cable. They also regularly struck Mr. Arar in the stomach, face, and back of the neck with

their fists.”12 They placed Arar where he could hear the screams of other prisoners who were
being tortured.13 They “threatened to place him in the spine-breaking ‘chair,’ hang him upside
down in a ‘tyre’ and beat him, and give him electric shocks.”14 Arar noticed that the questions
the Syrian officials asked him were very similar to those asked by the FBI agents in JFK airport.15
To stop them from torturing him, he confessed falsely to a number of charges, including
traveling to Afghanistan for terrorism training.16
The beatings stopped after the Canadian Embassy made contact with Arar on October 20,
2002, but Arar spent most of the next ten months confined to an underground cell that was three feet
wide, seven feet high, and six feet long.17 The cell was damp, cold, almost completely dark, and had

no sanitary facilities.18 Arar was not permitted to exercise, was allowed to bathe once a week in
cold water, and was not fed adequately.19 He lost forty pounds during this period.20 In August of

2003, Syrian officials forced Arar to sign a false confession and transferred him to another prison
for six weeks, before returning him to the Palestine Branch.21 On October 5, 2003, they told him he
had been cleared of all charges and released him.22
The complaint charged that the defendants knew exactly what would happen to Arar in Syria,
and sent him there for that reason:
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Defendants conspired with officials in the Syrian government and/or aided and abetted Syrian government officials
in their plan to arbitrarily detain, interrogate, and torture Mr. Arar. Defendants intentionally detained Mr. Arar and
then removed him to Syria so that Syrian authorities could interrogate him under torture.23

It also charged that the defendants continued to collaborate with Syrian intelligence during
Arar’s imprisonment and torture:
On information and belief, Defendants provided their Syrian counterparts a dossier on Mr. Arar, compiled in part
from the interrogations at JFK. On information and belief, Defendants suggested matters to be covered by Syrian
security officers during Mr. Arar’s interrogation….On information and belief, Syrian security officers turned over
to the Defendants all information coerced from Mr. Arar during his interrogations under torture in Syria.24

Arar is suing the government officials in both their official and private capacities, under the
U.S. Constitution, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter “Convention Against
Torture”, “CAT” or “Torture Convention”) for a declaration that the defendants acted illegally as
well as compensatory and punitive damages.25
Maher Arar’s lawsuit is the first direct legal challenge to the U.S. practice of sending
terrorism suspects to be interrogated in countries that routinely torture prisoners. This policy,
which the CIA calls “rendition” and human rights groups call “torture outsourcing,” began in the mid-

1990s but has become more common and operated with fewer legal constraints since September
11. Human rights groups have estimated that there have been “100 to 150”26 or “150 to 200” 27
renditions since the 2001 attacks. Rendition may become even more common if the U.S.
government is dissatisfied with the restrictions that courts impose on the detention center at
Guantánamo Bay.
The government and individual defendants have not yet filed an answer to Arar’s factual
allegations or his arguments about the legality of rendition. Instead they have moved to dismiss
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Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶¶ 55 - 56.
Id. at ¶¶ 1 - 6.
Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005.
Michael Gawenda, U.S. Defends “Rendition” of Terror Suspects, THE AGE (Australia), Mar. 9, 2005.
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the complaint on a number of jurisdictional grounds,28 and alternatively because trying the case
would allegedly require the revelation of classified information that could “cause exceptionally

grave or serious damage to the intelligence, foreign policy, and national security interests of the
United States.”29 If the district court accepts either of these arguments Arar’s case will be dismissed
before discovery, whether or not Arar’s allegations are true and whether or not what happened to

him is legal.
Out of court, the administration has argued that Arar’s deportation was legal because it
obtained promises from Syria that he would not be tortured, and cited the Syian government’s
subsequent denials that Arar was tortured.30 The United States seeks similar “diplomatic
assurances” not to torture before every rendition, and the administration has repeatedly argued
that obtaining these assurances is enough to meet the United States’ obligations under the
Torture Convention. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales wrote in response to questions from the Senate
during his confirmation hearings that “assurances from a country that it will not engage in torture…

can provide a basis for concluding that a person is not likely to be tortured if returned to another
country.”31 President George W. Bush32 and White House spokesman Scott McClellan33 have

also cited assurances in defending the practice of rendition.The Bush administration has
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Memorandum in Support of Government’s Motion to Dismiss, Arar v. Ashcroft, filed Sept. 17, 2004 (E.D.N.Y.) (No. CV-00249). See also,
e.g., Memorandum in Support of John Ashcroft’s Motion to Dismiss, Arar v. Ashcroft, filed Oct. 4, 2004 (E.D.N.Y.) (No. CV-00249). The other
individual defendants’ legal claims are quite similar to Ashcroft’s.
29 Declaration of James B. Comey, Arar v. Ashcroft, filed Jan. 18, 2005 (E.D.N.Y.) (No. CV-00249), at ¶ 6. See also Memorandum in Support of
the United States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, filed Jan. 18, 2005 (E.D.N.Y.) (No. CV-00249).
30 For example, on November 20, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft told Canadian reporters that “[i]n removing Mr. Arar from the U.S., we
acted fully within the law and applicable international treaties and conventions” and noted Syria’s denials that Arar was tortured as “fully
consistent with the assurances that the United States government received prior to the removal of Mr. Arar.” Tim Harper, Arar Deportation
“Within Law”: Ashcroft, TORONTO STAR, Nov.21, 2003, at A13.
31 Responses of Alberto Gonzales, Nominee to be Attorney General, to the Written Supplemental Questions of Senator Richard Durbin (Jan.
2005) (copy on file with author).
32 At a press conference on March 16, 2005, President Bush told reporters that suspects are only rendered “with the promise that they won’t be
tortured. That’s the promise we receive. This country does not believe in torture. We do believe in protecting ourselves. We don’t believe in
torture.” President George W. Bush, Press Conference (Mar. 16, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050316-3.html).
33 McClellan told reporters on March 17, 2005 that “[w]hen people are rendered to another country, we seek assurances that they won’t be
tortured….We believe in adhering to our laws and our treaty obligations.” White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, Press Briefing (Mar. 17,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050317-4.html).
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maintained that Maher Arar’s deportation complied fully with these laws, because the United
States obtained diplomatic assurances from Syria that Arar would not be tortured.34
This Article will put aside the procedural and jurisdictional questions that may well decide
Arar’s lawsuit, in order to address the substance of his charges and the administration’s defenses.
Section I will examine the publicly reported facts about Arar’s rendition, which provide strong
corroboration for thecharges in his complaint.

The rest of the paper will address the argument that rendition is legal as long as the CIA
obtains diplomatic assurances from foreign governments that they will not torture prisoners. Section II
will describe the two basic limits that the Convention Against Torture and its implementing
legislation and regulations place on prisoner transfers: the United States cannot render prisoners
to countries where they are more likely than not to face torture, and must consider all relevant
evidence in determining whether the odds of torture after a rendition are greater than fifty
percent.
Section III is an exhaustive survey of the publicly known factual evidence about the danger of
torture after a rendition.
Section IV will argue that this evidence, which the CAT forbids the administration from
ignoring, shows that the odds of torture after a rendition are much higher than fifty percent and
that diplomatic assurances are legally worthless.

I. AHMAD EL-MAATI, ABDULLAH ALMALKI,
AND MAHER ARAR

Maher Arar was not the first Canadian citizen interrogated and tortured in Syria about his alleged
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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al-Qaeda ties in the wake of September 11. Ontario residents Ahmad Abou el-Maati and
Abdullah Almalki were arrested in Syria before Arar.35 Unlike Arar, el-Maati and Almalki
traveled to Syria voluntarily; they were not “rendered” by the United States. But their cases are relevant
in understanding the relationship between the U.S. and Syrian intelligence services, the basis for

sending Arar to Damascus, and the likelihood that the United States knew he would be tortured
there. Arar was probably deported partly on the basis of evidence that Almalki and el-Maati gave under
torture in Syria.

Ahmad el-Maati, a truck driver from Toronto, was the first to be arrested. In August of 2001,
U.S. border guards stopped and searched el-Maati’s truck. Inside they found “a schematic map of Ottawa
marking government buildings and nuclear research facilities.”36 El-Maati said the map had been left

in the glove compartment by another driver. He was released after eight hours of interrogation, but
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”) officials kept him under surveillance after he

returned to Toronto.37 El-Maati has sworn in an affidavit that CSIS agents questioned him
shortly after the September 11 attacks, and threatened that “they would stop the [immigration]
sponsorship of my Syrian wife” if he did not cooperate.38

In addition to the map incident, Canadian officials may have suspected el-Maati because he
had trained with an Afghan mujahideen militia in the early 1990s, had taken flying lessons near
an airport in Toronto,39 and because his brother, Amer el-Maati, is on the FBI’s terrorism wanted
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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There is actually a fourth Canadian citizen arrested and reportedly tortured in Syria, Arwad al-Buchi. But al-Buchi resided in Saudi Arabia for
six years before his arrest in July 2002, and there does not appear to be any direct connection between his imprisonment and Arar’s. Al-Buchi is
still in Syrian custody. See Press Release, Syrian Human Rights Commission, Urgent Call to Release Arwad Al-Buchi (Nov. 14, 2003) (available
at http://www.shrc.org/english/appeals/2003/14112003/14112003.htm); Michelle Shepard, Ex-Ottawa Man Held in Syria for Two Years,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 22, 2004, at A2.
36 Colin Freeze, Arar Case Began Amid Fear of Attack on Ottawa, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 16, 2004.
37 Id.
38 Colin Freeze, Arar Accuser Says He Was Tortured, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 29, 2004. El-Maati was then legally married to the woman for the
purposes of immigration sponsorship, but the religious ceremony, reception and consummation of the marriage was planned to take place in
November in Syria. Jeff Sallott, Once A Muhajed Who Took Flying Lessons, Ahmad El Maati Seemed toFit the Profile of a Terrorist, GLOBE &
MAIL, Aug. 29, 2005.
39 See Jeff Sallott, Once A Muhajed Who Took Flying Lessons, Ahmad El Maati Seemed toFit the Profile of a Terrorist, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug.
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list.40
In November 2001, el-Maati flew to Syria for his wedding ceremony and reception.
According to his affidavit, Canadian police or intelligence officials questioned him in the Toronto
airport, and kept him under surveillance on the plane.41 When he arrived in Syria on November
12, he was arrested at the airport.42 He was taken to the Palestine Branch and held in a tiny,
underground cell.43

El-Maati has charged that Syrian prison guards forced him to lie naked while they poured ice
water on him, burnt him with cigarettes, and beat him with cables, until he agreed to sign “a false
confession of false events…I signed and fingerprinted in order to stop the vicious and constant
torture.”44 He told interrogators that he and his brother45 were planning to blow up Canada’s

Parliament, and that two casual acquaintances of his, Abdullah Almalki and Maher Arar, were
also involved in the plot.46

El-Maati was transferred from Syrian to Egyptian custody in January of 2002.47 He has said
that Egyptian interrogators, like those in Syria, had information about him that only could have
come from Canadian intelligence. They also practiced torture. At a prison outside Cairo “[a]n electric
prod was used on [el-Maati’s] hands, legs and genitals during interrogations. His hands were cuffed so
tightly that his wrists bled.”48 In July of 2002 he was transferred to another Egyptian security facility,
where
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29, 2005.
40 “FBI Seeking Information: Amer El-Maati”, at http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/el-maati.htm (last accessed Feb. 13, 2005). In November of
2001, a document granting Amer el-Maati Canadian citizenship was discovered in an al-Qaeda safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan. Cam Simpson,
U.S. Seeks Help in Finding Terror Suspect, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 12, 2002.
41 Colin Freeze, Arar Accuser Says He Was Tortured, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 29, 2004.
42 Id.
43 See Jeff Sallott, Once A Muhajed Who Took Flying Lessons, Ahmad El Maati Seemed toFit the Profile of a Terrorist, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug.
29, 2005. The article does not name the Palestine Branch but says that el-Maati was held at the same facility as Maher Arar.
44 Colin Freeze, Arar Accuser Says He Was Tortured, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 29, 2004.
45 Id.
46 Michelle Shepard, Untangling Tale of Tortured Canadian, TORONTO STAR, May 1, 2004, at A1.
47 Michelle Shepard, Egyptians Free Canadian Man, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 16, 2004, at A19.
48 Jeff Sallott, Once A Muhajed Who Took Flying Lessons, Ahmad El Maati Seemed toFit the Profile of a Terrorist, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 29,
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He was kept blindfolded and handcuffed in a hallway with other prisoners for what he estimates was about two
weeks. It was during this time, Mr. El Maati says, that he developed anal bleeding. Canadian doctors later
diagnosed an anal fissure requiring surgery.49

El-Maati told the Globe and Mail that he was first allowed to see a Canadian consul on
August 12, 2002. During this visit
The Egyptians were present, so Mr. El Maati felt he could not talk freely about his treatment by the Egyptian
authorities. But he decided to take a chance, and says he blurted out about how the Syrians had tortured him….He
says he used the word torture, not a euphemism. He says he saw them write the word down. He says he specified
that he had been beaten with a cable.50

Canadian government documents from August 2002 show that the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (“RCMP”) discussed “a proactive measure to discuss media lines to be used when Ahmad
El-Maati’s allegations about torture” became public.51
Egypt released el-Maati in January 2004,52 and he returned to Canada two months later.53 He
was never charged with anything in Canada, and a Canadian newspaper reported shortly after elMaati’s release that “[h]is Middle Eastern captors no longer regard him as a suspect.”54 A
Canadian government official told the same newspaper that “I would say the chance of it [a plot]
being likely was 35 per cent, and 65 per cent not….I know a lot of people don’t believe this, but
we are involved in a war -- it’s called a war on terror. And in any kind of war, innocents are hurt.”55

Abdullah Almalki, an engineer from Ottawa, was the second Canadian to be arrested in Syria.
Almalki had been under the surveillance by Canadian intelligence since 1998, when he told a
CSIS agent that he once worked for a non-profit refugee resettlement program in Pakistan whose
administrator, Ahmed Said Khadr, had ties to al-Qaeda.56 Almalki later sold components for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2005.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Colin Freeze, Mounties Warned Against Release of Arar, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 27, 2004.
52 Id.
53 Canadian Returns After Long Ordeal in Syrian and Egyptian Jails, CANADIAN PRESS NEWSWIRE, Mar. 30, 2004
54 Freeze, Arar Case Began Amid Fear of Attack on Ottawa, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 16, 2004.
55 Id.
56 Jeff Sallott, For the First Time, Abdullah Almalki Tells His Story, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 27, 2005.
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radio equipment to the Pakistani military; he has said this equipment could not be used in
weaponry and was not illegal to export.57 Almalki has stated that he cooperated fully with
authorities every time they questioned him, but he continued to receive increased scrutiny at
airports and from the Customs Bureau, and the CSIS questioned Almalki’s acquaintances about
him several times.58 He was interviewed by a CSIS officer a week after the September 11 attacks,

and he and his wife believed they were being followed by police or intelligence agents.59
In October 2001, Arar and Almalki had lunch in a restaurant in Ottawa. The Globe and Mail
has reported that “[d]ocuments filed at the Arar commission say this was the first time Mr. Arar
came to the attention of the RCMP anti-terrorist investigators.”60 In late November, partly out of
frustration with this scrutiny, Almalki and his family began a long visit with his wife’s relatives in
Malaysia.61
In May 2002, Abdullah Almalki traveled to Syria to visit a sick grandmother. He was taken
into custody when he arrived at the Damascus airport on May 3, 2002.62
Almalki, like Arar and el-Maati, has described being imprisoned in an underground cell that was
approximately one meter wide, two meters long, and two meters high.63 He was held there for 482

days.64 Almalki told the Globe and Mail that he was tortured severely. On the first day, “he
remembers one of the torturers standing on his back while another lashed the soles of his feet

with a thick, twisted cable…The pain was so intense, he says, he lied to stop the beatings….He

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. Almalki told reporters that he was able to identify precise dates because “he made a calendar for himself on a piece of tissue paper with a
pen that the guards had failed to find in his cargo pants.” Id.
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says his interrogators told him he had endured more than a thousand lashes”65 Two days later,
he was stripped down to his underwear, blindfolded, bent over and stuffed into a tire with his backside sticking out
one side and his head and lower legs sticking out the other. He says the torturers raised his legs so his weight was
on his back on the floor and he could not move. They beat him on the soles of his feet, his head, torso, and
genitals.66

On July 18, 2002, he was beaten for most of the day with metal cables, and tied to and
suspended from a metal window frame with a piece of rag, and then untied and beaten again until
“he could not move or feel his hands.”67
These descriptions, which Almalki gave to reporters in August 2005, are quite similar to
Maher Arar’s account of Almalki’s treatment in November 2003. Maher Arar told Canadian
reporters that when he encountered Almalki in Syria’s Sednaya prison on September 19 or 20,
2003:
I did not recognize him. His head was shaved, and he was very, very thin and pale. He was very weak. When I
looked closer, I recognized him. It was Abdullah Almalki….He told me he had been severely tortured -- with the
tire, and the cable. He was also hanged upside down. He was tortured much worse than me. He had also been
tortured when he was brought to Sednaya, so that was only two weeks before.68

Amnesty International reported on November 4, 2003, probably based on information from
Arar, that
Abdallah al-Malki has reportedly been subjected to a form of torture known as the dullab, which involves hanging
the victim from a suspended tyre and beating him or her with sticks and cables. He has apparently also been given
electric shocks and has been beaten around his body with cables as well as kicked in the head.69

During these interrogations, Almalki was repeatedly asked about information that he believed
could only have come from Canadian police or intelligence. Interrogators several times referred
to information as coming from Canadian reports or Canadian officials, and once told Almalki
that Canadian intelligence had asked to question Almalki directly.70
Almalki described being interrogated about Maher Arar on at least two occasions. On the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Maher Arar, Statement to the Media (Nov. 4, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/arar_statement.html).
Press Release, Amnesty International, Syria: Fear of Torture and Ill-Treatment/Unlawful Detention/Incommunicado Detention/Ill-Health,
Abdallah al-Malki (Nov. 4, 2003) (available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE240382003?open&of=ENG-376).
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fortieth day of Almalki’s interrogation, Syrian intelligence officials began a series of “new
questions about a specific list of about 20 people from Canada, including Mr. Arar.”71 Almalki has
alleged that later on, four days after Arar was detained at JFK airport and before Arar’s
deportation to Syria, he was brought up for an interrogation that focused on Arar.72 If this is
accurate it strongly suggests that Syria was interrogating Almalki about Arar at the United States’
request.

Abdullah Almalki’s wife Kuzimah Khalifa and his brother Youssef told Canadian reporters
that when released from prison in March 2004, Almalki suffered from an improperly healed broken
foot, an injured hip, back pain, balance problems, impaired memory and concentration, and post-

traumatic stress disorder.73 In July 2004, a Syrian judge acquitted Almalki of all terrorism-related
charges but ordered him to perform thirty months of compulsory service in the Syrian military.74 This
order was either rescinded, not enforced, or disobeyed; Almalki returned to Canada the next
month.75 He has not been charged with any crime.
Arar’s relationship with Almalki and el-Maati seems to have been the main reason or only reason for
his deportation. According to the Globe and Mail, Canadian government documents show that the RCMP
regarded Arar as merely a “peripheral” and “secondary” figure, or a “potential witness,” in their terrorism
investigations.76 As noted above, in April 2002, before Almalki’s arrest, Arar successfully renewed a U.S.
work permit. After Almalki’s arrest, airport officials not only would not admit Arar to the United States;
they considered him too great a security risk to let him return to Canada or deport him to Switzerland.
During Arar’s initial interrogation at JFK airport on September 26, U.S. intelligence officials focused
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Jeff Sallott, For the First Time, Abdullah Almalki Tells His Story, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 27, 2005.
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See Michelle Shepard, Ottawa Engineer Acquitted in Syria, TORONTO STAR, July 27, 2004, at A1; Canuck in Syria Seeks Help, WINNIPEG
SUN, July 28, 2004, at 10.
74 Michelle Shepard, Ottawa Engineer Acquitted in Syria, TORONTO STAR, July 27, 2004, at A1.
75 Kate Jaimet, Ottawa Man Held in Syria Returns Home, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 10, 2004
76 Colin Freeze, Mounties Warned Against Release of Arar, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 27, 2004.
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heavily on his relationship with Abdullah Almalki. When Arar said that they were only casual
acquaintances -- Almalki was the brother of a co-worker and they had had lunch together once in October,
2001 -- interrogators began “yelling at me that I had a selective memory” and produced a copy of Arar’s
apartment lease that was witnessed by Abdullah Almalki in 1997.77 Arar’s interrogation sessions in Syria
centered on his relationship with Abdullah Almalki.78 Arar was also questioned about Ahmed el-Maati,
whom he said he knew even less well than Abdullah Almalki. Arar later told the Toronto Star that “I saw
[el-Maati] at a garage in Montreal, that was about four years ago. I don’t remember everything we talked
about, nothing special.”79
Arar’s relationship with Almalki and el-Maati was the “only stated reason” the INS gave in its
October 2002 decision ordering Arar’s deportation to Syria.80 INS Eastern Region Director J. Scott
Blackman wrote that:
I have determined that Arar is a member of the designated foreign terrorist organization known as al-Qaeda. The
FBI interviewed Arar on September 27, 2002, at JFK International Airport. During the interview, Arar admitted
his association with Abdullah Almalki.81

The decision noted Arar’s October 2001 lunch meeting with Almalki, and said that Arar
“advised the FBI that Almalki exports radios and that one of his customers was the Pakistani
military.”82 It gave no details about Arar’s alleged relationship with el-Maati, stating only that

“[d]uring the September 27, 2002, interview at JFK, Arar admitted knowing Ahman [sic] ElMaati.”83
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Maher Arar, Statement to the Media (Nov. 4, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/arar_statement.html).
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Arar v. Ashcroft, supra note 1, at ¶ 54.
Michelle Shepard, Untangling Tale of Tortured Canadian, TORONTO STAR, May 1, 2004, at A1.
Colin Freeze, U.S. Cited Acquaintances in Deporting Arar, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 23, 2004.
Id.
Id.
Id. Blackman’s decision does refer to a “classified addendum” providing further information about Arar, but I think that most likely contains
information from Almalki’s and el-Maati’s interrogations in Syria. I should emphasize that this has not been confirmed, it is only my best
working hypothesis. It is supported not only by Almalki’s and el-Maati’s descriptions of being tortured and interrogated about Arar, but also by
the legal documents the government filed in Arar v. Ashcroft, asking the court to dismiss Arar’s suit because it would require the disclosure of
state secrets. See Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Assertion of State Secrets Privilege [hereinafter “Defendants’ State Secrets
Privilege Memorandum”], filed Jan. 18, 2005; Declaration of Tom Ridge [hereinafter “Ridge Declaration”], filed Jan. 17, 2005, Arar v. Ashcroft.
(E.D.N.Y.) (No. CV-00249). The memorandum makes it clear that the assertion of states secret privilege relates to the classified addendum to
Blackman’s decision. See Defendant’s State Secrets Privilege Memorandum at 8 - 9. Former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge’s
declaration states that the material in that classified addendum:
relates to the United States’ intelligence activities and intelligence information regarding the plaintiffs. It contains
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Blackman’s decision is one of many government documents and other independent sources that
corroborate Arar’s allegations about his deportation and torture:

• A Canadian government study on the CSIS’s role in Arar’s deportation contains an
excerpt from the Canadian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s initial summary of the Arar case,
which gives the same dates as Arar’s legal complaint for Arar’s detention, meetings with
the Canadian consul and his attorney, INS hearing, disappearance from the Brooklyn
Metropolitan Detention Center, and appearance in Syria.84

• Canadian Consul Maureen Girvan met with Arar in New York on October 3. Girvan’s
notes on the meeting, written shortly afterwards, show that Arar told her that the United
States had threatened to deport him to Syria.85
• Amal Oummih, Arar’s attorney, has said the INS gave her false information about Arar’s
whereabouts in the days immediately before he was taken to Syria. Shortly after Arar’s
deportation Oummih told the Boston Globe, “They told me there was a hearing, but they
never notified me…They won’t tell me where he was deported to. I kept asking and finally

[an INS official] told me, ‘You won’t find him in the U.S.’”86
• Canadian government documents indicate that U.S. officials did not give Canadian
diplomats truthful information about Arar’s whereabouts while he was being deported to
Syria. A declassified Canadian government memo states that U.S. authorities told
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
numerous references to intelligence sources and methods, the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to
cause exceptionally grave or serious damage to the national security of the United States and its foreign relations or
activities. Disclosure of this information would enable adversaries of the United States to avoid detection by the
nation’s intelligence activities, sources, and methods, and/or take measures to defeat or neutralize those activities, thus,
causing extremely grave or serious damage to the United States’ national security interests. In addition, disclosure of
the information relied upon to reach each of the three noted decisions would post an exceptionally grave or serious risk
to diplomatic relations and national security.
Ridge Declaration at ¶ 5.
84 SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE, THE ROLE OF CSIS IN THE MATTER OF MAHER ARAR 14-15 (May 19, 2004).
85 Michelle Shepard, Arar Requests Hearing in Public, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 24, 2004, at A14.
86 Cindy Rodriguez, Mystery Surrounds U.S. Deportation of Canadian, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 18, 2002, at A31.
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Canadian consular officials on October 7, 2002 that Arar would have a deportation
hearing later that day, and Canadian officials believed he would be represented by a lawyer
there. In fact the hearing took place late at night on October 6, and Arar’s lawyer was not

told about it until after it had happened.87 On October 8, Canadian officials called the
Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention Center, and were “advised that Mr. ARAR was not
longer there. American officials refused to provide any information as to where Mr.
ARAR [was]…it was not until October 10…that American officials confirmed that Mr.
ARAR had been deported to Syria.”88
• The final order deporting Arar to Syria was signed by then-Deputy Attorney General
Larry D. Thompson, the second highest ranking official in the Department of Justice.89
• Arar has described being placed in a small private jet in an airfield in New Jersey, and
flown to Washington, D.C., Portland, Maine, Rome, and finally to Amman Jordan.90 Federal

aviation records obtained by The New York Times show that on the night of Arar’s
deportation, a Gulfstream III Jet chartered by the CIA with the tail number N829MG flew
from New Jersey, to Dulles International Airport in Washington D.C., to Bangor, Maine, to
Rome.91 (The records only show flights that begin or end in the United States, and so do
not include any flight from Rome to Jordan.)92
• A document outlining the strategy for Canada’s Security Intelligence Review Committee’s
inquiry into the Arar case stated that the committee would investigate “[Arar] being held
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Jeff Sallot, Chrétien Was Kept in the Dark About Arar, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 9, 2004.
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW COMMITTEE, THE ROLE OF CSIS IN THE MATTER OF MAHER ARAR 14-15 (May 19, 2004).
Dana Priest, Top Justice Aide Approved Sending Suspect to Syria, WASH. POST, November 19, 2003, at A28, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A59678 - 2003Nov18&notFound=true.
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12, 2003, at A14.
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92 Id.
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at a CIA debriefing station in Jordan.”93
• The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz has reported that the CIA is operating a secret interrogation
center for eleven high level al-Qaeda suspects in Jordan, according to “anonymous international
intelligence sources… involved in interrogating the detainees.”94 Arar has described being

briefly held and questioned in a prison in Jordan95 where he was taken between floors on
an elevator. He told the Toronto Star, “it is very strange to find prisons with elevators in
the Middle East. This place was not like the Syrian prisons.”96
• A December 2002 briefing note on the Arar case for the Canadian Minister of Foreign
Affairs stated that Arar was “accompanied by U.S. and Jordanian officials” (emphasis added)

when taken into Syrian custody.97
• The State Department’s 2001 - 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
Syria describe severe and widespread torture by the country’s intelligence service.98 The
2004 report states:
According to Amnesty International (AI) and the Human Rights Association of Syria, there were
eight persons who died in detention due to torture or mistreatment by the security services during
the year…. Former prisoners and detainees, as well as the HRAS, reported that torture methods
included administering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum;
beating, sometimes while the victim was suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine;
bending the detainees into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body parts; and using a
backward-bending chair to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim’s spine. Torture was most
likely to occur while detainees were being held at one of the many detention centers run by the
various security services throughout the country, particularly while the authorities were
attempting to extract a confession or information.99

• The details of Arar’s description of his detention and torture in Syria are consistent with
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Michelle Shepard, Arar May Have Spent Time at Secret CIA Facility, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 15, 2004.
Yossi Melman, CIA Holding Al-Qaida Suspects in Secret Jordanian Lockup, HA’ARETZ, Oct. 13, 2004.
Maher Arar, Statement to the Media (Nov. 4, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/arar_statement.html).
Michelle Shepard, Arar May Have Spent Time at Secret CIA Facility, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 15, 2004.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SYRIA -- 2004 (Feb. 2005); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
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99 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SYRIA -- 2004 (Feb. 2005),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41732.htm.
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human rights groups’ reports on conditions in Syrian prisons. For example, Arar stated
that on his first day of interrogation at the Palestine Branch, “If I did not answer quickly
enough, [the interrogator] would point to a metal chair in the corner and ask ‘Do you want me to
use this?’ “100 Human rights groups’ reports on Syria frequently describe a torture device

known as the “German Chair”, described as “a metal chair with moving parts which
stretches the spine and causes severe pressure on the neck and legs.”101 Amnesty International’s

2002 report on Syria describes prisoners being tortured with the German Chair and being
beaten with cables at the Palestine Branch.102 A separate Amnesty International press alert
refers to “the tiny, underground cells referred to as ‘tombs’ or ‘graves’ by the detainees

and prison guards” in the Palestine branch, and describes conditions very similar to what
Arar said he experienced.103
• As noted above, Arar, el-Maati and Almalki gave consistent descriptions of conditions in the
Palestine Branch and the torture methods used by interrogators there.
•

In August of 2003, before Arar’s release, the Syrian Human Rights Committee (“SHRC”)
wrote in a letter to Arar’s wife that according to “confirmed reports from confidential and
knowledgeable sources,” Arar had “received heavy and severe torture” in Syria.104

• On October 4, 2003, Arar told the press that he had falsely confessed under torture in
Syria to attending an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.105 The New York Times
reported on November 15, 2003 that “American officials who spoke on condition of
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Maher Arar, Statement to the Media (Nov. 4, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/arar_statement.html).
E.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2002: SYRIA (2002), http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/mde/syria?Open.
Id.
Press Release, Amnesty International, Appeal Case -- Syria: Syrian German Held Three Years Without Charge in Rat-Infested Syrian
“Tomb” (Oct. 8, 2004) (available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE240662004ENGLISH/$File/MDE2406604.pdf).
104 Foreign Affairs Says Arar Not Being Tortured, CTV.CA NEWS, Aug. 14, 2003,
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Arar’s description of his own torture; SHRC alleged that Arar had been tortured with “beating by sticks and shredded cables on the sole of his
feet and on his body, the use of electricity and being squashed in a car tire for long hours, etc.,” allegations that Arar himself did not make after
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anonymity…say [Arar] confessed under torture in Syria that he had gone to Afghanistan
for terrorist training, named his instructors and gave other intimate details.”106
• According to Canadian government documents, Francisco Pillarella, Canada’s
ambassador to Syria, was given a written and “verbal briefing of the results of the
Syrians’ investigation of Arar” in November of 2002.107 He passed the information to the
CSIS,108 which later leaked the details of the confession Arar made in Syria to Ottawa

Citizen reporter Juliet O’Neill.109
• Syrian diplomat Imad Moustapha told 60 Minutes II that Syria had shared its reports
about Arar with American intelligence, and that “[w]e always share information with anybody
alleged to be in close contact with al-Qaeda with the United States.”110

• In another known case of rendition to Syria, U.S. officials told Time magazine that
American agents in Damascus were submitting written questions for Syrian interrogators to
ask al-Qaeda suspect Muhammad Haydar Zammar, and receiving reports of the
interrogation sessions.111 “State Department officials like the arrangement,” Time
reported, “because it insulates the U.S. government from any torture the Syrians may be
applying to Zammar.”112 Zammar, like Arar, was held in an underground, tomb-like cell in

the Palestine Branch.113
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Arar has given a consistent, detailed description of his experience since he first spoke to
reporters in October 2003. It has been corroborated by independent sources over and over again,
including government documents and flight records that only became public long after Arar first made his
allegations. There is little doubt that the factual charges in his complaint are true.

II. THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVALUATING DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NOT
TO TORTURE

Arar’s lawsuit alleges that his deportation to Syria violated Article 3 of the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Article
3 states that:
1. No State party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another state where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account
all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern
of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.114

The Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture subject to the understanding that the
phrase “substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subject to torture”
would be interpreted “to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured.’”115
The treaty is not self-executing.116 Article 3 was incorporated into U.S. law by section 2242
of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”), which provides in part:
(a) Policy. It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary
return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in
danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States.
(b) Regulations. Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the heads of the appropriate
agencies shall prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
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subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United States Senate
resolution of ratification of the Convention.117

The Bush administration has maintained that Maher Arar’s deportation and every rendition
complied fully with these laws, because the United States obtained diplomatic assurances from
Syria that Arar would not be tortured, as it does before every rendition. According to the
Washington Post, the procedure for obtaining assurances is brief and informal: the CIA station chief
of the country where the prisoner is being rendered requests a verbal assurance from the foreign
intelligence service, and then cables the assurance back to CIA headquarters.118 It is not clear what

steps, if any, the U.S. takes to verify compliance with assurances.
There are no publicly available executive orders or CIA or Department of Defense regulations about
how to evaluate diplomatic assurances or determine when a suspect is more likely than not to be tortured.

There are federal immigration regulations and court decisions on the same subject, which apply
directly in Arar’s case and which are a useful comparison in other cases insofar as they correctly
interpret the requirements that Article 3 imposes.
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(c) and 1208.18(c)119 say that the Secretary of State “may forward to the

Attorney General” a country’s assurances not to torture, and the Attorney General “shall
determine, in consultation with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are sufficiently
reliable to allow the alien’s removal to that country consistent with Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture.”120 This determination can be delegated to the Deputy Attorney General or the
head of the immigration service, but not to anyone else.121 Asylum officers, immigration judges,
and the Board of Immigration Appeals cannot review the Attorney General’s decision to accept
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Foreign Affairs Reform and Reconstruction Act of 1998, § 2242, Pub. L. No. 105 - 277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681 - 822, codified as note to 8
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assurances,122 and judicial review is barred except in the context of review of a final order of
removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act.123 However, foreclosing judicial and

administrative review does not change the Attorney General’s obligation to comply with Article
3 of the Torture Convention as implemented by FARRA. § 208.18 only authorizes the Attorney
General to accept assurances if they are “sufficiently reliable”;124 it does not provide any guidelines or
standards for how the Attorney General shall evaluate their reliability.

8 C.F.R. § 208.16 explains the general standard for withholding and deferral of removal under
the Convention Against Torture in immigration cases. Subsection (c)(2) states that the applicant must
prove that he or she is more likely than not to be tortured if sent to a country.125 The applicant’s

testimony can meet this burden without additional corroborating evidence, if it is found credible.126
Subsection (c)(3) provides that:
In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of
removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered, including, but not limited to:
(i) Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;
(ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be
tortured;
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal, where
applicable; and
(iv) Other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal.127

A. “ALL EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE TORTURE SHALL BE
CONSIDERED.”
Stated as a negative, the requirement that “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future
torture shall be considered” means that it is illegal to disregard any information about the
likelihood of torture. The Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
all overturned Convention Against Torture decisions by immigration judges and the Board of
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Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) for failing to consider relevant evidence about the risk of torture.128
Article 3 of the CAT, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16, and the court decisions implementing them all
recognize that some of the most relevant evidence of the danger of torture is a country’s human
rights record. Article 3 states that in evaluating the danger of torture in another country, “the competent
authorities shall take into account… the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.129 Accordingly, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 requires immigration
officials and judges to consider “[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within
the country of removal”130 in CAT cases. The Ninth Circuit stated in Kamalthas v. INS that “country
conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief under the Convention [Against Torture].”131
The Third Circuit has agreed,132 and noted that the official human rights reports that the State Department
publishes each year “are the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource” for determining country
conditions.133 The Sixth,134 Seventh135 and Eighth136 Circuits have also overturned and remanded CAT
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decisions in cases where the BIA did not adequately consider relevant information from State Department
human rights reports.
This does not mean that the courts will automatically grant withholding of removal to anyone who
comes from a country that practices torture. Showing that you are being deported to a country that tortures
does not in itself prove that you personally are more likely than not to be tortured if deported. As the
Seventh Circuit held in Rashiah v. Ashcroft,
Though the country report supports the contention that torture occurs in Sri Lanka, it does not demonstrate that it is
more likely than not that petitioner will be tortured if he returns….a country report that describes instances of
torture unrelated to the applicant does not provide a basis for withholding removal without evidence that the
applicant himself will be targeted.137

Two factors are particularly important in Circuit Courts’ evaluation of whether country
conditions show that the petitioner will be tortured if he or she is sent back: the applicant’s

membership in a group that the state has specifically targeted for torture, and the likelihood that
the applicant will be imprisoned if returned.
In Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit upheld the Immigration Judge’s denial of CAT
relief because the applicant failed to prove either of those things.138 The court explained that
while the Country Reports showed evidence that citizens opposing Sierra Leone’s ruling party “are
specifically targeted for torture, including limb amputation,” Tarrawally “has introduced no

evidence other than his own testimony” that he belonged to any opposition group, and the
Immigration Judge found his testimony not to be credible.139 He also provided “no evidence…that
the government detains individuals re-entering Sierra Leone”; therefore “the IJ did not err in
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refusing to grant relief.”140
In another Third Circuit case, Zubeda v. Ashcroft, the court vacated the BIA’s decision denying
relief in part because the BIA did not give enough weight to the Immigration Judge’s finding that
“I am convinced that [Zubeda] would be detained upon her arrival,” which “greatly bolsters
Zubeda’s claim under the Convention given the apparent likelihood that she would be raped if
detained.”141 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit overturned an Immigration Judge’s decision in
Camara v. Ashcroft because the judge failed to consider evidence of Guinea’s “brutal repression”
of the applicant’s political party, and ignored “documentary evidence that she has escaped from
prison and was now wanted by the police,” including an outstanding arrest warrant.142
If these regulations and decisions are correct interpretations of the CAT -- and they seem to
follow directly from the Article 3 requirement that “authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations” in evaluating the danger of torture -- then obtaining a diplomatic assurance that a

prisoner will not be tortured after a rendition is not automatically sufficient for compliance. An
unverified promise from Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco or Uzbekistan that it will not torture a prisoner
may be relevant to the likelihood of torture, but it cannot be the only relevant evidence. The country’s

record “of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights”143 is also relevant, as is the fact that
prisoners are sent directly into the custody of military intelligence for the purposes of detention
and interrogation. U.S. officials are also obligated to consider the country’s previous treatment of
this detainee or other similarly situated detainees: other prisoners rendered by the United States or

being interrogated at the request of the United States, other prisoners whom the government
promised not to torture, other prisoners accused of involvement with Islamist terrorism, others being
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held at a particular prison, etc. They must decide based on all of this evidence whether a detainee
is more likely than not to be tortured if he is rendered.

B. “MORE LIKELY THAN NOT THAT HE OR SHE WOULD BE TORTURED IF REMOVED”
The regulations state that “[t]he burden of the proof is on the applicant…to establish that it is
more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.”144 The courts take these words
quite literally. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Hamoui v. Ashcroft, to get CAT relief, the applicant
“has to show only a chance greater than fifty percent that he will be tortured if removed.”145 This
is a purely objective test; “there is no subjective component for granting relief under the CAT.”146
The federal courts regard the BIA’s final determination about whether an applicant is more
likely than not to be tortured as a finding of fact.147 As such, it is “conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”148 In contrast, the BIA’s
or immigration judge’s decision to exclude or disregard relevant evidence about the possibility of
torture is considered a legal error entitled to no deference. Because of the different standards of
review, the courts are much less likely to overturn a BIA’s decision because the Board evaluated the
evidence badly than because the Board disregarded the statute’s command to consider all relevant
evidence. But it does happen.149

In cases where the courts have found that the evidence compelled the conclusion that a suspect was
more likely than not to be tortured, three factors have been given special weight: evidence of past
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torture and threats of future reprisal against the applicant; the likelihood that the applicant would be
imprisoned upon his or her return; and a country’s record of torturing similarly situated individuals. The
first of these factors is not present in most cases of rendition,150 but the latter two are.
The prospect of imprisonment was an important factor in the 2005 case Namo v. Gonzales. The
Sixth Circuit held that based on the applicant’s credible testimony that “there was a warrant outstanding
for his arrest in Iraq,” combined with previous torture by government agents for failure to finish a
construction project on schedule, “one must conclude that he met his burden” of proof under the
Convention Against Torture.151
The torture, murder, or disappearance of the applicant’s family members was central in three other
cases. In Farah v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit held that the applicant’s membership of the Marchan clan
in Somalia at a time when the Hawiye clan controlled the country and “the State Department Country
Report supports the conclusion that a member of another clan would have ‘a good chance of being subject
to torture,’” combined with the applicant’s testimony about his brother’s murder and his sister’s rape and
murder by members of the Hawiye clan, “compels the conclusions that Farah will more likely than not be
tortured in removed.”152 In an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, Figueroa-Hincapie v. Fasano, the court
held that the Colombian government’s past imprisonment and torture of Figueroa’s father for union
organizing, the recent assassination of another labor activist’s son in Figueroa’s hometown, and
Colombia’s general patterns of human rights abuses formed a record that “compel[led] the conclusion”
that Figueroa was more likely than not to be tortured.153 In Zewdie v. Ashcroft, evidence that the
Ethiopian government had seized and detained Zewdie’s husband after she fled the country, combined
with physical evidence that she was been tortured by the government during a previous imprisonment and
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her testimony that the government had threatened her with reprisal if she returned, convinced the Eighth
Circuit that “no reasonable fact finder could fail to find Zewdie eligible for relief.”154

In the context of rendition, there no doubt at all that suspects will be detained and
interrogated upon their arrival in the receiving state. There is not evidence about the torture or
mistreatment of detainees’ families, but there is a great deal of evidence of the treatment of similarly
situated prisoners. The torture of suspects previously rendered to the same country after a diplomatic

assurance not to torture is probably at least as strong a predictor of the danger of torture for the next
suspect rendered there as the mistreatment of an asylum seeker’s relatives. Evidence about the torture of
other accused Islamic terrorists who were never in U.S. custody is also very relevant, as is the
country’s general record “gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”

Again, the Convention Against Torture and FARRA require the federal government to
consider all of this information before deciding whether a prisoner is more likely than not to be
tortured if removed.

III. THE DANGER OF TORTURE AFTER RENDITION

The next section will examine the “evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” after
a rendition. Subsections A and B will give a detailed history of the rendition program before and after
September 11, respectively. Subsection C will summarize U.S. officials’ statements about the reliability
of diplomatic assurances and the likelihood of torture after rendition.
A. HISTORY OF RENDITION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11

The United States began rendering terrorism suspects to be interrogated in Middle Eastern
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countries during Bill Clinton’s presidency.155 According to Michael Scheuer, the former head of
the CIA unit charged with dismantling al-Qaeda, by the mid-1990s the CIA had identified and
located al-Qaeda leaders, but “we couldn’t capture them because we had nowhere to take
them.”156 Scheuer told BBC Radio that “basically, when CIA came back and said to the
policymaker, where do you want to take them, the answer was -- that’s your job.”157 The CIA
decided to send the suspects to third countries. In 1995, American intelligence proposed “rendering”
suspects to Egypt, and Hosni Mubarak’s government readily agreed.158 “What was clever was that

some of the senior people in al-Qaeda were Egyptian,” Scheuer explained to The New Yorker. “It
served American purposes to get these people arrested, and Egyptian purposes to get these people
back, where they could be interrogated.”159
Scheuer stated that during the years when he was involved in renditions, “there was a legal
process”160 approved by attorneys at the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Department of
Justice.161 Every suspect had been convicted in absentia by a foreign government,162 and:
The idea that somehow this is a rogue operation that someone dreamed up is absurd…As I remember when I was
the chief, after the lawyers have vetted the information and had said, ‘Okay, you can do this legally,’ I think it
went to either the Director of Central Intelligence or to the Assistant Director of Central intelligence. So basically
the number one and two men in the intelligence community are the ones who sign off.163

Scheuer continued, “I have never been involved in a case where I was not convinced, based
on the intelligence, the information that was available, that these people deserved to be off the
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street….Now, were mistakes made? Absolutely.”164
The New Yorker has repored that the CIA remained in close contact with the Egyptian
intelligence service after a rendition: “The partnership between the American and the Egyptian
intelligence services was extraordinarily close: Americans could give the Egyptian interrogators
questions they wanted put to the detainees in the morning, Scheuer said, and get answers by the
evening.”165 However, Egypt refused to allow American agents to question suspects directly.166

The CIA sought diplomatic assurances that suspects would not be tortured before these transfers, but
Scheuer has expressed doubts about their reliability. Asked whether detainees were tortured, Scheuer

told BBC Radio, “It wouldn’t be us torturing them.”167
Former CIA Director George Tenet has testified that the agency had conducted over seventy
renditions in the years before the attacks.168 These were not all “extraordinary renditions” in the

sense this Article uses the term; approximately twenty were extrajudicial prisoner transfers to the
United States.169
We know the names of nine of the suspects rendered before September 11. All were sent to
Egypt.

1. Talaat Fouad Qassem (September 1995)

Talaat Fouad Qassem, an Egyptian Islamist who had been granted asylum in Denmark, was
arrested in Zagreb, Croatia, in September 1995.170 U.S. officials questioned him for two days on a
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ship in the Adriatic Sea, focusing on an alleged assassination plot against President Clinton by
Egypt’s Islamic Group, also known as Gamaa-el-Islamiya.171 On September 22, according to
former Egyptian cleric and British asyleeYasser al-Sirri, the United States sent Qassem to Egypt.172
Egypt had previously imprisoned Qassem for seven years for a suspected role in the plot to
assassinate Anwar Sadat. Qassem escaped in 1989. In 1992, an Egyptian military tribunal sentenced
him to death in absentia, and pressured Pakistan to extradite him without success.173

Islamic militant sources in Egypt told a Boston Globe reporter that Egypt took Qassem to
their intelligence headquarters in al-Mansoura, then moved him to Cairo in October 1995.174 On
November 5, 1995, Gamaa-el-Islamiya alleged to United Press International that Qassem was
“undergoing barbaric tortures” to gain intelligence.175 These charges were not independently
verified, and Qassem has not been seen since.176 Egypt has refused to comment on his
whereabouts or on whether he is dead or alive.177 Qassem’s wife has said she believes he was
executed several years ago,178 as has Egyptian journalist Hossam el-Hamalawy.179

2. Ahmed Osman Saleh, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Naggar, Shawki Salama Attiya, Essam Abdel Tawwab, &
Muhammad Hassan Tita
(July & August 1998)
In 1998, the CIA arranged for Ahmed Osman Saleh, Ahmed Ibrahim al-Naggar, Shawki
Salama Attiya, Essam Abdel Tawwab, and Muhammad Hassan Tita to be sent to Egypt for
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interrogation and imprisonment. According to the Wall Street Journal, they were all members of an

Islamic Jihad cell in Tirana, Albania that U.S. officials considered “among the most dangerous
terror outfits in Europe.”180
The CIA had been aiding Albania’s intelligence service in conducting surveillance on the suspects
since the early 1990s.181 In 1998, with U.S. considering military action in nearby Kosovo, Ahmed

al-Naggar and Shawki Attiya began making frequent phone calls to Islamic Jihad leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri.182 At the time, Islamic Jihad was merging with al-Qaeda and shifting its focus from

attacks on the Egyptian government to attacks on American targets.183 In the spring of 1998, the
CIA asked Albania to help round up six local suspects. According to Albanian intelligence officials,
the CIA sent approximately twelve agents to coordinate the arrests.184 The U.S. and Albania
spent three months planning the operation; Egypt issued pre-arranged charges and extradition
requests against some of the suspects during this time.185
Shawki Attiya was arrested on June 26, 1998, and flown to Cairo on a CIA-chartered private
jet on July 2.186 Ahmed al-Naggar was also arrested and flown to Cairo in early July.187
Muhammad Hassan Tita was sent to Egypt about two weeks later.188 In August, Ahmed Osman
Saleh was arrested in Tirana and Essam Abdel Tawwab was arrested in Sofia, Bulgaria.189 All
five men were turned over to Egyptian intelligence as soon as they arrived in Cairo, and tried
with dozens of other suspects before a military tribunal in a trial that became known as the
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“Returnees from Albania” case. All five alleged that they were tortured in Egyptian custody.
The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (“EOHR”) sent an observer to the trial, and
recorded the following allegations of torture from the evidence presented by the prosecution and
defense.190 (I have not attempted to correct errors in spelling, translation or grammar.)

Shawki Salama Attiya, called Shawki Salama Mustafa in EOHR documents,
said in his testimony before the State Security Prosecution that he was detained for 65 days, the water covered his
knee and he was tortured as follows: - His legs were tied and he was dragged on his face. - He was tortured also in
the State Security Investigation as he was tied, his legs and hands was tied, his legs and hands was suspended and
they passing electricity to his male organ and castrates191 and they even threatened of sexually abusing him.192

Essam Abdel Tawwab, called Essam Abdel Tawab Abdel Aleim in EOHR documents,
said in his testimony before the State Security Prosecution that he was tortured in the State Security prosecution as
follows: - He was beaten by hands and legs. - He was assaulted by a sharp tool which resulted in a wound cut by
the right hands. - His hands and feet were tied and he was hanged. - Electricity was connected to sensitive parts in
his body.193

Naggar, called Ahmed Ibrahim El Sayed El Nagar in EOHR documents,
said in his testimony before the State Security Prosecution that he was detained in an unknown place for 35 daysas he stated to the EOHR lawyers. During this period he was blindfolded and was lodging for 24 hours in a room
covered with water to reach his knees and then he was moved to State Security investigation and he was tortured
as follows: - His legs and his hands were tied behind his back. He was forced to lie on a sponge mattress and a
chair was put on his chest and another between his leg. Electricity was passed to his body and he was forced to
make confessions during torture.194

Muhammad Hassan Tita stated in his written confession that “[a]fter I was arrested, [Egyptian
interrogators] hung me from my wrists and applied electricity to parts of my feet and back.195 Ahmed

Osman Saleh told his lawyer, Hafez Abu Seada of EOHR, that he was tortured with electrical
shocks and by being suspended from the ceiling of his cell.196
Ahmed Naggar’s brother Muhammad told the Wall Street Journal that he and several of his other
relatives had been tortured by Egyptian police,197 and “said he had suffered broken ribs and
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fractured cheekbones.”198
Naggar and Saleh had already been convicted in absentia on other terrorism charges and
sentenced to death.199 They were hanged in February 2000.200 Attiya was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and Tita and Tawwab were sentenced to ten years in prison.201

3. Ahmed Salama Mabrouk, Essam Hafez, &
Ihab Muhammad Saqr (July or September 1998)
The United States helped arrange the transfer of Ahmed Salama Mabrouk and Essam Hafez
from Azerbaijan to Egypt in 1998. Mabrouk and Hafez, allegedly close associates of Ayman alZawahiri, were defendants in the same Egyptian mass trial as Attiya, Naggar, Saleh, Tawwab and

Tita. A Egyptian newspaper description of the trial in March of 1999 states that Ahmed Salama
Mabrouk “shouted from his cage that he was arrested in September in the course of a business trip in
Azerbaijan…Mabrouk, like the other defendants, alleged that he had been tortured.”202 The same article

reports that Hafez “said he was also arrested in September in Azerbaijan in the course of a
business trip.”203

A U.S. intelligence research group reported in April 1999 that the leader of London’s Islamic
Observation Center, Yasir al-Sirri, “affirmed that it was U.S. intelligence that apprehended”
Hafez and Mabrouk in Baku, Azerbaijan and handed them over to Egypt.204 The same article
reported that before being sentenced to hard labor for life by Egypt, Mabrouk had boasted of a
plan against attacks on U.S. targets that he said “was on a computer disk confiscated from him
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during his arrest by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Azerbaijan.”205 More recently, The New
Yorker also reported that the CIA arrested Mabrouk and another Islamic Jihad member in Baku,
and that Mabrouk’s “laptop computer turned out to contain vital information” about the terror
network, but gave the date of the arrest as July 1998.206
A third suspect, Ihab Saqr was also transferred from Azerbaijan to Egypt in 1998.207 Some
sources say he was arrested at the same time as Mabrouk and Hafez,208 but other descriptions of
Mabrouk’s and Hafez’ arrests make no mention of Saqr.209 This may only be because Saqr was
tried separately, several months after the “Returnees from Albania” case,210 or it may be that the
arrests were actually separate incidents.
Hafez and Mabrouk were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor.211 I could
not find any reports on the outcome of Saqr’s trial.

The allegations of torture after these renditions are consistent with the State Department’s
1995 - 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Egypt, which all alleged widespread
and severe torture of prisoners, sometimes ending in death.212 According to the 2001 report, for example,
Principal methods of torture employed by the police, as reported by victims, included: Being stripped and
blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching the floor; beaten with fists, whips,
metal rods, or other objects; subjected to electrical shocks; and doused with cold water. Victims frequently report
being subjected to threats and forced to sign blank papers to be used against the victim or the victim’s family in the
future should the victim complain of abuse. Some victims, including male and female detainees, reported that they
were sexually assaulted or threatened with the rape of themselves or family members….
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Human rights organizations and the press reported on the death in custody of four persons, reportedly under police
torture, during the year.213

Moreover, as noted above, the Washington Post has reported that “after years of fruitless talks
in Egypt” about the torture of suspects, President Bill Clinton cut off funding and cooperation with the
directorate of Egypt’s general intelligence service.”214 This indicates that the Clinton administration

knew that suspects rendered to Egypt were being tortured despite diplomatic assurances.
B. HISTORY OF RENDITION SINCE SEPTEMBER 11

After September 11, the rendition program expanded, and began operating under fewer legal
restrictions. Anonymous “current and former government officials” told the New York Times that
several days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush
signed a classified order that allowed the CIA to carry out renditions without White House,
Department of State, or Department of Justice approval of individual prisoners’ transfers.215 The
CIA was also authorized to transfer prisoners to countries where they did not face any criminal
charges, “solely for the purpose of detention and interrogation.”216 United Press International
reported that the document was called a “memorandum of notification,” and was signed on September
17, 2001.217

The number of renditions since September 11 has been estimated at “100 to 150” 218 and
“150 to 200.”219
The following are the specific cases of rendition since September 11 that are publicly known.
To simplify the legal analysis in Section IV, they are arranged by country.
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1. Renditions to Egypt
Egypt’s human rights record has not improved since September 11. The Statement
Department’s 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 human rights reports all discuss widespread and severe
torture in Egyptian prisons.220 The 2004 report cited a study by the Egyptian Organization for
Human Rights that
documented 41 cases of torture in police stations resulting in 15 deaths in custody from April 2003 to April 2004.
EOHR also asserted that from April 1993 to April 2004, it documented 412 cases of torture in police stations,
including 120 cases where detainees died as a direct result of torture.221

The known cases of rendition to Egypt since September 11 are listed below. For discussion of
Egypt’s alleged torture of Ahmad el-Maati, see Section I.

a. Mamdouh Habib (October 2001)
In early October 2001, Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib was arrested in Pakistan, where he
has been accused of attending Lashkar-e-Taiba and al-Qaeda training camps222 and of fighting
against U.S. forces.223 Habib has made the following allegations about his subsequent treatment,
as reported through his attorney in an application for a temporary restraining order:224
Habib was held for three weeks in several different Pakistani prisons.225 In one prison, he was
interrogated by three intelligence agents, one man and two women, who spoke English with
American accents.226 He was eventually taken to an airfield near Islamabad, where “he struggled
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and was forcibly subdued by several” Americans.227 All spoke English with an American accent,
and one had an American flag tattooed near his wrist.228 After they restrained and handcuffed
Habib, one “placed his foot on Mr. Habib’s neck and posed while another took pictures.”229
Habib’s clothes were cut away with scissors.230 He was dressed in a “blue track suit” and
transferred to a plane, which flew him to Cairo.231
Makhdoom Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, later told the Australian
television show Dateline that Habib was sent to Egypt on U.S. orders and in U.S. custody: “The US
wanted him for their own investigations. We are not concerned where they take him,” Hayat said.232 He

also stated that Egypt had not requested Habib’s extradition.233
Habib told his lawyer that he was imprisoned in Egypt for six months, in a windowless six by eight
foot cell, and that he was routinely and brutally tortured during his interrogation sessions:234
Mr. Habib, handcuffed and sometimes suspended from hooks on the wall, was kicked, punched, beaten with a
stick, and rammed with what can only be described as an electric cattle prod. If he lapsed into unconsciousness
they would revive him and continue the beatings.235

Habib described being held in three different water-filled rooms.236 In one the water level rose
gradually, until it was just below his chin if he stood on his toes; he remained this way for several hours.
In another, the water only reached his knees, but the room’s ceiling was too low to stand and guards
would not allow him to sit or kneel.237 In a third, where the water rose to his ankles, guards showed

him a large electric switch in the next room and told he would be electrocuted if he did not
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confess.238 Habib also described being tortured with electric shocks until he fainted, and being
threatened with sexual assault by a trained German Shepard dog.239

There is some corroboration for these allegations. Dr. Hajib al-Naumi, Qatar’s former justice
minister, told Dateline that according to reports from contacts of his in Egypt, Habib “was in fact
tortured. He was interrogated in a way which a human cannot stand up…We were told that he --

they rang the bell that he will die and somebody had to help him.”240
In the spring of 2002, Habib was transferred from Egypt to Bagram Air Force Base in
Afghanistan, and then to the U.S. detention facility in Guantánamo Bay.241 Ian Kemish, a spokesman

for Australia’s Foreign Affairs Department, told Dateline that ten days after he arrived in
Guantánamo, Habib “made some serious complaints about maltreatment during his time in Egypt”
to visiting Australian officials.242

Several prisoners who have been released from Guantánamo have described encountering
Habib there. In July 2004, three British detainees, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Rhuhel Ahmed,
gave a detailed public statement that made the following allegations about Habib’s condition:
[Mamdouh] Habib himself was in catastrophic shape - mental and physical. As a result of his having been tortured
in Egypt he used to bleed from his nose, mouth and ears when he was asleep. We would say he was about 40 years
of age. He got no medical attention for this. We used to hear him ask but his interrogator said that he shouldn’t
have any. The medics would come and see him and then after he’d asked for medical help they would come back
and say if you cooperate with your interrogators then we can do something.243

Jamal al-Hirith, an English detainee who was returned to Manchester in March, 2003, also has
described Habib bleeding from his nose and ears.244 Harith recently told The New Yorker that Habib
said that he had been in Egypt for about six months, and they had injected him with drugs, and hung him from the
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ceiling, and beaten him very, very badly. He seemed to be in pain. He was haggard-looking. I never saw him walk.
He always had to be held up.245

Former detainee Tarek Dergoul, also from England, described Habib to Dateline as
Very confused, dizzy. Dazed. Weak. Slow - he spoke very slow - he spoke in riddles. I couldn’t really make out, I
mean, like he was telling me stuff about Egypt, he’d been taken to Egypt…He told me he’d been electrocuted, put
in water, electrocuted, he’d been stripped, been punched, kicked and punched, used as a punching bag. He said
something about a dog being put on him as he was naked. Cigars put out on his body. Blindfolded.246

On November 18, 2004, Habib’s lawyer Joseph Margulies read a news report that Egypt was
negotiating with the United States for the return of five prisoners from Guantánamo Bay to
Egypt, including Habib.247 On November 24, Margulies applied for a temporary restraining order
preventing his client’s transfer to Egypt.248 U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green denied this

application without prejudice on November 29, apparently based on the government’s
reassurances that they were not currently planning to send Habib to Egypt, but ordered the government
to provide at least five days advance notice before any transfer.249 In early January, 2005 John

Altenburg of the U.S. Office of Military Commissions ruled that there was insufficient evidence
for Habib’s case to go before a commission.250 On January 28 Habib was sent from Guantánamo
to Sydney, Australia, where he has not been charged with a crime but remains under
surveillance.251

b. Ahmed Agiza & Muhammad al-Zery (December 2001)
On December 18, 2001, the United States transported Swedish asylum seekers Ahmed Agiza and
Muhammad al-Zery from Stockholm’s Bromma airport to Cairo. Paul Forell, a police officer
stationed at the airport that night, gave a very detailed account of the rendition to the Swedish
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television show “Kalla Fakta.”252

Forell said he waited with the Swedish security police and two Americans in civilian clothing
for the prisoners.253 The suspects arrived after twenty minutes. They were handcuffed, footcuffed
and blindfolded, and were each escorted by three or four American agents, who were also wearing
hoods or balaclavas.254 Forell stated that one of the masked American agents was giving orders.255

Forell escorted the suspects into a small room and waited outside.256 An anonymous source
told Kalla Fakta that in the changing room, Agiza and al-Zery’s clothes were cut off.257 They were
given rectal suppositories, which the witness believed contained sedatives, and dressed in dark
overalls.258 “When they left the changing-room, they had their clothes changed into overalls, and
were still with handcuffs and footcuffs. They were taken out to the cars, and then away,” Forell said.259

According to the Washington Post, declassified Swedish government documents
summarizing the case “noted that ‘the American side’” had offered to assist in the deportation
“by lending a plane for the transport,” and that “the transport from Sweden to Egypt was carried
out with the help of American authorities.”260 Swedish diplomats wrote in a confidential memo
that their government agreed to the deportation only after Egypt gave assurances that Agiza and AlZery would “not be subjected to inhuman treatment or punishment of any kind.”261

Airport records show that a Gulfstream V jet identified by the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) registration number N379P flew from the Swedish airport to Cairo that
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night.262 Agiza and al-Zery were held in the Masra Tora prison, which is just south of Cairo.263
Agiza’s mother Hamida Shalaby says they were tortured there. She told Kalla Fakta,
The mattress had electricity. The mattress. He would lay on it - like this - and his arms in chains on both sides and
his legs in chains too. When they connected to the electricity, his body would rise up and then fall down and this
up and down would go on until they unplugged electricity.264

Shalaby said this happened four times from December 19 to February 20, and “every day”
Agiza was tortured with electrodes while strapped to a chair.265
Hamida Shalaby and Agiza’s father made similar but more detailed allegations about Agiza’s
treatment in submissions to the United Nations Committee Against Torture in a suit brought by
Agiza’s wife.266 The submissions, as summarized by the Committee, alleged that on a January 23,
2002 visit to Masra Tora prison, Agiza
seemed pale, weak, seemingly in shock and near breakdown. His eyes, cheeks and feet were allegedly swollen,
with his nose larger than usual and bloodied. He told that he had been tied and hung upside down while
transported to the prison, and then being constantly blindfolded and subjected to advanced methods of
interrogation, including electric shocks.267

On April 16, 2002,
He allegedly whispered to his mother that he had been further tortured by electric shocks after the January visit,
and held in solitary confinement for about ten days. His arms and legs were tied behind his back and he could not
relieve himself. He said he had told the Swedish Ambassador about the torture, and that prison officers had urged
him to decline further visits from the Ambassador. He stated that officers had told him his wife would be returned
soon, and they threatened to assault her and his mother sexually. He said he remained in solitary confinement, in a
cell measuring two square meters, without windows, heat or light and that, while not tied, he could only visit the
toilet once every 24 hours, which caused him kidney problems.268

Swedish government documents corroborate some of these allegations. Sven Linder,
Sweden’s ambassador to Egypt, wrote a public report of a visit with the prisoners stating that Agiza and
al-Zery said they were treated “excellently” and “seemed well-nourished and show no external signs of
physical abuse.”269 However, a classified section of the same report noted that Agiza had complained
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of repeated beatings in prison.270

Al-Zery was released from prison in October of 2003, but as of last July he had not been
permitted to leave the country and was being kept under surveillance by Egyptian intelligence.271
He canceled an interview with the Washington Post on the orders of an Egyptian security
official.272 In an interview with Kalla Fakta conducted under the supervision of Egyptian security
officers, al-Zery denied that he had been tortured.273 But al-Zery’s lawyer, Kjell Jonsson, told the
Swedish program that
it´s evident that he is speaking under coercion. . . This information, that they have been tortured is now confirmed.
It is about very painful torture. They fasten electrodes to the most sensitive parts of the body. That is, genitals,
breast nipples, tongue, ear lobes, underarms. There are physicians present to judge how much torture, how much
electricity, the prisoners can take. Afterwards the exposed parts are anointed, so that there won´t be marks and
scars, and cold water is poured to stop blood clots.274

Agiza had been convicted in absentia by a military court in the “Returnees from Albania”
case, and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor.275 In February 2004 Agiza’s attorney,
Hafez Abu Seada of EOHR, requested a retrial on the grounds that his client had been unable to defend
himself and was convicted largely on the testimony of one unreliable witness.276 In April 2004, Hosni

Mubarak overturned the sentence and ordered a retrial by another military tribunal, which quickly
reached the same verdict and sentence.277 Later that year Abu Seada alleged in a speech that “Agiza
was tortured during his detention in state security investigations headquarters and Tora Prison and kept
blindfolded for a month…He was kept in solitary detention for 46 days in punishment for complaining
about having been tortured.”278
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In May 2005, the United Nations Committee Against Torture found that Sweden’s
cooperation with Agiza’s rendition violated Article 3 of the CAT, and that “[t]he procurement of
diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no mechanism for their enforcement, did not
suffice to protect against” the “manifest risk” of torture.279

c. Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi (late 2001 or early 2002)
Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who ran al-Qaeda’s terrorist training camp in Khalden, Afghanistan,280

was captured by Pakistani forces several months after September 11 and turned over to the
United States for interrogation.281 There was a disagreement between the FBI and CIA about how
to interrogate al-Libi. FBI agent Jack Cloonan told The New Yorker that he advised agents in

Afghanistan to “handle this like it was being done right here, in my office in New York.”282 FBI
agents read al-Libi his rights, and an FBI interrogator told Newsweek, “he was basically
cooperating with us,”283 But the CIA believed al-Libi was lying,284 and:
[t]he CIA station chief in Afghanistan, meanwhile, appealed to the agency’s hawkish counterterrorism chief, Cofer
Black. He in turn called CIA Director George Tenet, who went to the White House. Al-Libi was handed over to
the CIA. “They duct-taped his mouth, cinched him up and sent him to Cairo” for more-fearsome Egyptian
interrogations, says the ex-FBI official. “At the airport the CIA case officer goes up to him and says, ‘You’re
going to Cairo, you know. Before you get there I’m going to find your mother and I’m going to f--- her.’ So we
lost that fight.”285

Newsweek has reported that al-Libi was “a crucial source” for the Bush administration’s
allegations, in the months before the war in Iraq, that Saddam Hussein’s regime had provided al-Qaeda
with chemical weapons training.286 After the war, when interrogators revisited the subject with al–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Libi, he “ ‘recounted a different story,’ said one U.S. official. Some officials now suspect that alLibi, facing aggressive interrogation techniques, had previously said what U.S. officials wanted to
hear.”287 FBI agent Dan Coleman told The New Yorker “[i]t was ridiculous for interrogators to

think Libi would have known anything about Iraq. I could have told them that…The reason they got
bad information is that they beat it out of him.”288

Al-Libi was later transferred to Guantánamo Bay.289

d. Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni (January 2002)
Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni, a Pakistani national, was arrested in Jakarta, Indonesia on
January 9, 2002.290 Indonesian officials and diplomats told the Washington Post that this

happened at the CIA’s request.291 A few days earlier, the CIA had told Indonesian intelligence
that Madni was an al-Qaeda member who had worked with the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, gave
information about Madni’s location, and asked them to arrest him.292 Several days later, Egypt made a

formal request that Indonesia extradite Madni to them for unspecified, terrorism-related
crimes.293 However, according to “a senior Indonesian government official,” “[t]his was a U.S.
deal all along…Egypt just provided the formalities.”294 On January 11, the Indonesian officials
said, Madni was taken onto a U.S. registered Gulfstream V jet at a military airport, and flown to
Egypt.295

When the Washington Post article was written, in March of 2002, “intelligence sources” told
reporters that “Iqbal remains in custody in Egypt…The sources said he has been questioned by
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U.S. agents but there was no word on his legal status.”296 On September 11, 2004, the Times of
London reported that despite repeated inquiries by Madni’s relatives, “nothing has been seen or
heard from” him since he was taken from Jakarta.297 In November 2004, Kalla Fakta reported
that “[a]ccording to rumours in the intelligence communities in the west, Iqbal [Madni] died during
interrogations in Egypt.”298

I believe that Madni may actually have been transferred from Egypt to Guantánamo Bay. I
base this on the following excerpts from Shafiq Rasul’s, Asif Iqbal’s, and Rhuhel Ahmed’s
statement:
Moazzam Begg we never saw. We only heard about him, particularly from Saad Al Madini, who was a Pakistani
brought up in Saudi Arabia. He had been in Bagram Airbase with Moazzam Begg and he had himself been taken
from Bagram Airbase. He had been we think handed over by Indonesia to the Americans, kept in Bagram Airbase,
taken from Bagram airbase to Egypt where he had been tortured and then taken back to Bagram and then to
Guantanamo….299
Asif recollects that “another man who’d be taken to Egypt and tortured there, Saad Al Madini, was also refused
medical assistance for the same reason [as Mamdouh Habib]. We know from Al Madini that he had had electrodes
put on his knees and that something had happened to his knees and something had happened to his bladder and he
had problems going to the toilet. He told us that when he was in interrogation he was told by interrogators that if
he cooperated he would be first in line for medical treatment.300

I could not find “Saad al Madini,” or any name similar to it, on any of the lists of Guantánamo
prisoners. A Washington Post researcher whom I contacted about this told me that they could find

no similar names in their list of Guantánamo detainees.301 Based on this, the similarity of the
names “Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni” and “Saad al Madini,” and the description of the prisoner
being transported by Americans from Indonesia to Egypt,302 I believe that they are the same
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person.
The Guardian reported on September 12, 2005, that Madni “was held in Cairo for two years
before appearing in Guantánamo, where he told other detainees who have since been released that he

was tortured by having electrodes placed on his knees. It also appears that his bladder was
damaged during interrogation.”303 This seems to be based partly on Shafiq Rasul’s, Asif Iqbal’s, and
Rhuhel Ahmed’s statement; I do not know whether the Guardian found additional information

confirming that it was Madni whom the three Britons encountered.
e. Name Unknown (2002 or 2003)
Former CIA agent Vincent Cannistraro has described a senior al-Qaeda suspect held in
Guantánamo Bay who was sent to Egypt after refusing to cooperate with U.S.
interrogators.304“They promptly tore his fingernails out,” Cannistraro told Newsday, “and he
started to tell things.”305
f. Osama Moustafa Nasr (February 2003)

Osama Moustafa Nasr, an Egyptian cleric with al-Qaeda ties then living in Milan, was taken
into U.S. custody in Milan on February 17, 2003.306 Two witnesses told Italian police that they
saw several intelliegnce agents spray Nasr in the face with some sort of chemical, and force him into a
nearby van.307 According to Italian court documents, Nasr was then driven to Aviano, a U.S.

airforce base.308 CIA agents flew him from Aviano to another U.S. air base in Ramstein,
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Germany, and then from Ramstein to Cairo, where he was imprisoned by Egyptian security forces.309
In April 2004, Nasr was temporarily released from prison in Egypt and called his wife and at
least one other Muslim cleric in Italy.310 Italian police intercepted the calls.311 Nasr said he had
been tortured so badly that he lost hearing in one year, had been subjected to electric shocks, and was
barely able to walk.312

Shortly after these phone calls were made, Nasr was re-arrested in Egypt313 His brother told
reporters in July 2005 that he was still in prison.314
In June 2005, an Italian judge issued arrest warrants for thirteen CIA agents involved in Nasr’s
abduction.315 They have been charged with kidnapping.316 The agents have left Italy, and the

United States is unlikely to extradite them.317

2. Renditions to Syria
The State Department’s 2001 - 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Syria

describe severe torture by the country’s intelligence service.318 The 2004 report states,
According to Amnesty International (AI) and the Human Rights Association of Syria (HRAS), there were eight
persons who died in detention due to torture or mistreatment by the security services during the year…. Former
prisoners and detainees, as well as the HRAS, reported that torture methods included administering electrical
shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim was
suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; bending the detainees into the frame of a wheel and
whipping exposed body parts; and using a backward-bending chair to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the victim’s
spine. Torture was most likely to occur while detainees were being held at one of the many detention centers run
by the various security services throughout the country, particularly while the authorities were attempting to
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extract a confession or information.319

In addition to the alleged torture of Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, and Ahmad el-Maati
discussed in Section I, there is one known case of rendition to Syria:

a. Muhammad Haydar Zammar (November 2001)
Muhammad Haydar Zammar, a German citizen of Syrian descent320 suspected of recruiting
Muhammad Atta and several other September 11 hijackers into al-Qaeda,321 was arrested in
Morocco in November of 2001 and flown to Syria fifteen days later.322 Moroccan government
sources have told reporters that the CIA asked them to arrest Zammar and send him to Syria,323 and that
CIA agents took part in his interrogation sessions in Morocco.324 Moroccan officials said that the
stated basis for sending Zammar to Syria was a twenty-year-old charge that he was a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamist group, but Zammar did not receive an extradition hearing.325

Zammar was taken to the Palestine Branch, the same Syrian prison where Maher Arar would
later be held.326 On July 1, 2002, Time magazine reported,
US. officials tell Time that no Americans are in the room with the Syrians who interrogate Zammar. U.S. officials
in Damascus submit written questions to the Syrians, who relay Zammar’s answers back. State Department
officials like the arrangement because it insulates the U.S. government from any torture the Syrians may be
applying to Zammar. And some State Department officials suspect that Zammar is being tortured.327

The Daily Telegraph and Washington Post have also reported that U.S. agents were telling
Syrian interrogators what questions to ask Zammar.328
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In January 31, 2003, a Moroccan citizen named Driss bin Lakoul told the Washington Post
that he had been imprisoned at the Palestine Branch for three months starting in January 2002.329
Lakoul said that he had not encountered Zammar directly, but had heard other prisoners describe a
German citizen being held in the prison basement and taken out of his cell only to be interrogated and
tortured:330
There were five brothers in the prison’s underground area who saw [Zammar], three Saudis and two Yemenis.
They could talk with him down there; the walls were not thick. A brother from Saudi Arabia was in the cell next to
him, and this brother from Saudi Arabia also how this man was taken away to torture.331

Amnesty International reported in October 2004 that Zammar
remains detained in cell number 13 of the tiny cells referred to as ‘tombs’ or ‘graves’ by the detainees and prison
guards….Zammar’s underground cell is believed to be 185 cm long, less than 90 cm wide, and under two metres
high.332

Amnesty stated that Zammar, who weighed 300 pounds at the time of his arrest,333 “is now
said to be ‘skeletal’.”334
In April 2005, Amnesty International alleged that Zammar was moved from his underground
cell in the Palestine Branch to an unknown location in October 2004.335

3. Renditions to Uzbekistan
Craig Murray, the United Kingdom’s former Ambassador to Uzbekistan,336 has told reporters
he knows of several specific cases where the U.S. transferred prisoners to Uzbekistan. Murray
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told The New Yorker that he knew of “at least three” renditions to Uzbekistan.337 He later told the
CBS news program 60 Minutes that “I know of two instances for certain of prisoners who were
brought back in a small jet” operated by a company Murray called “Premier Executive
Airlines.”338 A Gulfstream V Jet owned by a Massachusetts company called Premier Executive

Transport Services is known to have been used in many renditions.339 Murray stated that
Uzbekistan routinely tortured prisoners using brutal means including “drowning and suffocation,
rape was used quite commonly, and also immersion of limbs in boiling liquid.”340 He also charged that
The CIA definitely knows. I asked my deputy to go and speak to the CIA. And she came back and reported to me
that she met the CIA head of station, who told her that yes, this material probably was obtained under torture, but
the CIA didn’t see that as a problem.341

However, CIA officials told CBS that this meeting never took place.342
Flight records obtained by the New York Times show that two planes used by the CIA in
renditions landed at the Tashkent, Uzbekistan airport on September 21, 2003.343 One of the planes had

departed for Tashkent from Baghdad, the other from the Czech Republic.344 It is not clear
whether these are the renditions that Murray described, or separate cases. Flight records for the planes
used in renditions show at least seven to ten total trips to Uzbekistan,345 and Murray has told the Times

that in 2003 and early 2004 CIA flights landed in Tashkent an average of twice a week.346
The 2001 - 2004 State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for Uzbekistan all
allege widespread, extremely brutal and in some cases fatal torture of prisoners. 347 The 2004 report
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charged that
police and the NSS routinely tortured, beat, and otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions or
incriminating information. Police, prison officials, and the NSS allegedly used suffocation, electric shock, rape,
and other sexual abuse; however, beating was the most commonly reported method of torture.348

All four reports noted that the worst human rights abuses were committed against those believed to
have ties to Islamic extremism, especially accused members of the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir.

According to the 2003 report,
Authorities reportedly routinely beat and treated prisoners suspected of extremist Islamic political sympathies,
particularly alleged members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, more harshly than criminals, regardless of whether investigators
were seeking a confession. A majority of the cases over the past few years in which persons were likely tortured to
death while in custody involved suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir members. Local human rights workers reported that
common criminals -- known as “prison boxers” -- were often paid or otherwise induced to beat Hizb ut-Tahrir
members.349

The 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 country reports describe the following specific instances of fatal
torture of Hizb ut-Tahrir suspects:
Emin Usman was arrested on February 21, 2001 on charges of belong to Hizb ut-Tahrir. He died in
custody approximately one week later. Police claimed he committed suicide, but a family member who
saw his body “reported that it bore clear signs of having been beaten.”350
Shovruk Ruzimuradov, accused of possessing Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets, died in custody on July 7, 2001.
An official investigation of his death concluded that he committed suicide, but family members said his
body showed clear evidence of torture.351
On October 16, 2001,
police arrested two brothers, Ravshon and Rasul Haitov, on suspicion of Hizb ut-Tahrir membership. On October
17, police returned the body of Ravshon Haitov to his family, which showed clear signs of torture; authorities
informed the family that he had died of a heart attack. His brother Rasul was beaten so severely that he became an
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invalid.352

The bodies of Hizb ut-Tahrir prisoners Mirzakomil Avazov and Khusnuddin Olimov were returned to
their families on August 7, 2002. They “were badly beaten and had burns attributable to scalding water
over significant portions of their bodies.” Police claimed “that the men died in an altercation with two
other inmates and that in the course of the fight hot water from a tea cauldron was spilled on them,” and
this was still the government’s official explanation two years later. However “independent analysis by
experts in the United Kingdom of photographs taken shortly after their deaths concluded that the

men had likely been suspended in boiling water.”353
On May 15, 2003, Hizb ut-Tahrir member Orif Ershanov died of injuries suffered during a

severe beating by security forces. Relatives’ photographs showed bruises on Ershanov’s chest, legs, and
the soles of his feet, broken ribs, wounds on the arm and back, and “evidence that sharp objects had been
inserted under the fingernails.”354 The official medical examiners report claimed that the cause of
death was high blood pressure.355

This may be an understatement of the number of torture deaths. The 2003 report noted,
In some cases, law enforcement officials warned families not to talk about their relatives’ deaths, which were often
attributed by government officials to purely natural causes…examiners’ reports routinely misstated the cause of
death or covered up abuses. In many cases (including death penalty cases), families were not told of their relative’s
death until after the body had been buried, making independent forensic investigation almost impossible. As a
result, rumors of detainees dying in custody as a result of mistreatment abounded but were generally impossible to
confirm. In no case in which a death in custody appeared to be due in whole or in part to torture or other
mistreatment was the death officially attributed to such causes.356

The State Department reports detail many other instances of severe torture of Hizb ut-Tahrir members
that the victim survived, and several other deaths in custody.
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4. Renditions to Jordan
The 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 State Department human rights reports for Jordan all discuss
credible allegations of torture by prisoners there.357 According to the 2001 report, for example,
prisoners there made allegations of “methods of torture include sleep deprivation, beatings on the soles
of the feet, prolonged suspension with ropes in contorted positions, and extended solitary

confinement.”358
There is one case of rendition to Jordan where the prisoner’s name is known:

a. Jamil Qasim Saeed Muhammad (October 2001)
At one a.m. in the morning of October 23, 2001, Pakistan handed Jamil Qasim Saeed
Muhammad over to U.S. officials in a dark corner of the Karachi airport.359 Muhammad, a
Yemeni microbiology student and an alleged suspect in the U.S.S. Cole bombing,360 had been
missing from Karachi University since early October.361 Pakistani officials told the Washington
Post that Muhammad was handed over without deportation or extradition proceedings.362 He was
shackled and blindfolded.363 An eyewitness told Pakistan’s News International that “the entire
operation was so mysterious that all persons involved in the operation, including U.S. troops,
were wearing masks,” and that a masked American agent filmed the handover.364 The witness
said Muhammad was placed onto a private jet with the tail number N379P, which departed to
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Amman, Jordan at 2:40 a.m.365 This is the same plane that later transported Ahmad Agiza and
Muhammad al-Zery to Egypt.366
Muhammad has not been seen since. Amnesty International asked the U.S. about his current
location and legal status, but received no reply.367
As noted in Section I, Canadian government documents and the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz
have indicated that the CIA may be operating an interrogation or debriefing station for al-Qaeda
suspects in Jordan.368 It is possible that Muhammad was held there rather than in Jordanian custody.
Since CIA detention centers are sometimes staffed by foreign nationals,369 there is no bright line

between this sort of detention and rendition, and there are several other cases where transfers to
secret CIA detention centers have initially been reported as renditions.370

5. Renditions to Morocco

The 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 State Department human rights reports for Morocco all
discuss credible allegations of torture by prisoners there.371 According to the 2003 report,
incidents of torture had recently risen, and those accused of terrorism were especially likely to be

tortured:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/17/sweden8620.htm).
365 Masood Anwar, Mystery Man Handed Over to U.S. Troops in Karachi, THE NEWS INTERNATIONAL (Pakistan), Oct. 26, 2001.
366 See Section III(B)(1)(b), supra.
367 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE 32 (Aug. 2003),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR511142003ENGLISH/$File/AMR5111403.pdf.
368 Yossi Melman, CIA: No Comment on Report 11 Qaida Suspects Held in Jordan, HA’ARETZ, Oct. 13, 2004, Michelle Shepard, Arar May
Have Spent Time at Secret CIA Facility, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 15, 2004.
369 E.g., Dana Priest, CIA Avoids Scrutiny of Detainee Treatment, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A2576-2005Mar2.html (referring to “Afghan guards -- paid by the CIA and working under CIA supervision in an abandoned
warehouse code-named the Salt Pit”).
370 For example, Khaled el-Masri, a German used car salesman, was mistaken for an al-Qaeda training camp leader with the same name and
flown from Macedonia to the CIA prison in Afghanistan known as the salt pit. The case was initially described as a rendition. See Don Van Natta,
Jr. & Souad Mekhennet, German’s Claim of Kidnapping Brings Investigation of U.S. Link, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, at A1, James Meek, ‘They
Beat Me From All Sides’, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 14, 2005, at 2, 60 Minutes: CIA Flying Suspects to Torture? (CBS television broadcast, Mar. 6,
2005, transcript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/04/60minutes/main678155.shtml).
371 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO -- 2004 (Feb. 2005); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO -- 2003 (Feb. 2004); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: MOROCCO -- 2002 (Mar. 2003); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES: MOROCCO -- 2001 (Mar. 2002). All of the State Department’s Country Reports from 1993 - 2004 are available at

54

Attorneys for some persons convicted under the new anti-terrorism law claimed their clients were convicted on the
basis of confessions coerced by torture. For example, according to the [Moroccan Human Rights Organization], in
early August, at the Court of Appeal in Fez, most of the 29 accused of terrorist involvement stated that they had
been tortured; judicial authorities refused to order any medical examinations.
In October after a mission to the country, [Amnesty International] reported a sharp rise in the number of cases of
torture or ill treatment in the last 2 years.372

Since September 11, one suspect has publicly alleged being sent to Morocco and tortured:

a. Benyam Muhammad (July 2002)
Benyam Muhammad, an Ethiopian national who had been granted asylum in Great Britain,
was arrested at the Karachi, Pakistan airport in April 2002. Muhammad alleged, as reported to
the Guardian from notes compiled by British human rights attorney Clyde Stafford Smith, that
he was held at two prisons in Pakistan over three months, hung from leather straps, beaten, and threatened with a
firearm by Pakistanis. In repeated questioning by men he believes were FBI agents, he was told he was to go to an
Arab country because “the Pakistanis can’t do exactly what we want them to”.
The torture stopped after a visit by two bearded Britons; he believes they were MI6 officers. He says they told him
he was to be tortured by Arabs.373

According to the Washington Post FBI agents originally threatened Muhammad with rendition to
Jordan,374 but in July 2002 he was flown to a prison in Morocco on a U.S. military plane. In Morocco,
U.S. officials accused him of being an accomplice of Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen who has been held has an
“enemy combatant” for several years.375 As the Post noted, in a June 1, 2004 press conference, Deputy
Attorney General James Comey stated that Padilla had an accomplice who “had refugee status in the
United Kingdom”, who was “in custody” but whose identity was classified.376
In Morocco, Muhammad has alleged, interrogators deliberately cut him with a scalpel:
They took the scalpel to my right chest. It was only a small cut. Maybe an inch. At first I just screamed . . . I was
just shocked, I wasn’t expecting . . . Then they cut my left chest. This time I didn’t want to scream because I knew
it was coming.
One of them took my penis in his hand and began to make cuts. He did it once, and they stood still for maybe a
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minute, watching my reaction. I was in agony. They must have done this 20 to 30 times, in maybe two hours.
There was blood all over. “I told you I was going to teach you who’s the man,” [one] eventually said.
They cut all over my private parts. One of them said it would be better just to cut it off, as I would only breed
terrorists. I asked for a doctor.377

Muhammad said that this was repeated “about once a month” during the eighteen months he was in
Morocco.378
Stafford Smith stated that he had seen scars on Muhammad’s body consistent with these
allegations.379
In January 2004, Muhammad was flown to Bagram Air Force Base in Kabul, Afghanistan. He stated
that when the plane picked him up,
a female MP took pictures. She was one of the few Americans who ever showed me any sympathy. When she saw
the injuries I had she gasped. They treated me and took more photos when I was in Kabul. Someone told me this
was “to show Washington it’s healing.”380

He was transferred to Guantánamo Bay in September 2004, and is currently being held there.381

C.U.S. OFFICIALS’ STATEMENTS ON THE RELIABILITY OF DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES
Several U.S. intelligence agents involved in renditions have told reporters that the CIA has
never believed that diplomatic assurances would prevent countries from torturing prisoners. For
example, Vincent Cannistraro, the former head of the CIA’s counterterrorism division, told the

Glasgow Herald in October 2002 that “Egyptian jails are full of guys missing toenails and
fingernails. It’s crude, but highly effective, although we could never condone it publicly. The
Egyptians and Jordanians are not that squeamish.”382 In relation to Arar’s case, Cannistraro later

told Knight-Ridder that “[y]ou would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe that the Syrians
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were not going to use torture, even if they were making claims to the contrary.”383
On December 26, 2002, the Washington Post reported the following quotations from CIA
agents and administration officials:
“If you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t doing your job,” said one
official who has supervised the capture and transfer of accused terrorists….
According to one official who has been directly involved in rendering captives into foreign hands, the
understanding is, “We don’t kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the
[expletive] out of them.”….
One official who has had direct involvement in renditions said he knew they were likely to be tortured. “I . . . do it
with my eyes open,” he said….
Bush administration officials said the CIA, in practice, is using a narrow definition of what counts as “knowing”
that a suspect has been tortured. “If we’re not there in the room, who is to say?” said one official conversant with
recent reports of renditions.384

Dan Coleman, a former FBI agent who worked with the CIA on terrorism cases, told the New
Yorker that there was never any question that Egypt tortured prisoners. The CIA “loved that
these guys would just disappear off the books, and never be heard of again. They were proud of it,”
Coleman stated.385 Retired CIA agent Robert Baer said that agents know exactly what to expect

from each country’s intelligence services: “If you want a serious interrogation, you send a
prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to
disappear -- never to see them again -- you send them to Egypt.”386
Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA unit charged with dismantling al-Qaeda and
other Islamist terror networks, told 60 Minutes in March 2005 that if rendition resulted in useful
information, “It’s OK with me…I’m responsible for protecting Americans.”387 But “the idea that

we’re gonna suddenly throw our hands up like Claude Raines in ‘Casablanca’ and say, “I’m
shocked that justice in Egypt isn’t like it is in Milwaukee,’ there’s a certain disingenuousness to that,” he
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stated.388

The Bush administration disputes this. In March 2005, an anonymous U.S. official told the
New York Times that “we check on those assurances, and we double-check on these assurances,”
that U.S. officials are assigned to verify that promises not to torture were kept, and that compliance was

“very high”.389 On February 16, 2005, CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Senate
Intelligence Committee that “of course, once [prisoners are] out of our control, there’s only so much
we can do. But we do have an accountability program for those situations.”390 Asked what Goss meant

by an “accountability program,” an anonymous intelligence official told the Washington Post
that “in some cases, the U.S. government is allowed access and can verify treatment of detainees.”391
Scheuer doubted Goss’ statement, arguing that “[t]hese are sovereign countries. They are not
going to let you into their prisons.”392 Nabil Fahmy, Egypt’s ambassador to the United States,
denied his country’s use of torture and stated that Egypt “wouldn’t accept the premise that we

would make a promise and violate it.” Another Arab diplomat told the Post, “[i]t would be stupid
to keep track of them because then you would know what’s going on…It’s really more like ‘Don’t
ask, don’t tell.” One anonymous intelligence official told the Post that assurances were “a farce”;

another, who had visited some of the prisons where suspects were sent, said that “[i]t’s widely
understood that interrogation practices that would be illegal in the U.S. are being used” and that “[t]hey
say they are not abusing them, and that satisfies the legal requirement, but we all know they do.”393

There have been two reports of diplomatic consequences for countries that violated assurances
not to torture prisoners. In December 2002, Dana Priest and Barton Gellman reported in the Washington
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Post that “after years of fruitless talks in Egypt” about the treatment of suspects, “President Bill
Clinton cut off funding and cooperation with the directorate of Egypt’s general intelligence
service.”394 However, an anonymous Bush administration official told Priest and Gellman that in

the wake of September 11, “[y]ou can be sure that we are not spending a lot of time on that
now.”395 More recently, Newsweek reported that soon after Maher Arar was sent to Syria, “the
administration made a secret decision to stop sending suspects to Syria. But officials
acknowledge that such scruples are being ignored when it comes to rendering suspects to allies
like Egypt and Jordan.”396 The official said the U.S. stopped sending prisoners to Syria because of

concerns over suspects’ treatment,397 but that may not have been the only factor; tensions with
Syria over the situation in Iraq were mounting at approximately the same time.398

IV. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

.As a matter of U.S. law, Article 3 forbids deporting an alien if he can show “a chance greater
than fifty percent that he will be tortured if removed.”399 Of the nineteen individual cases of
rendition examined above,400 there have been specific allegations of torture in sixteen. In two cases,
Talaat Fouad Qassem and Ahmad Mabrouk, the allegations of torture were not detailed and came
from a source of suspect credibility, but cannot be entirely discounted because of Egypt’s
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extensive history of torturing similarly situated prisoners. In the other fifteen, the allegations of

torture were much more detailed, and/or were consistent with other prisoners’ or human rights
reports’ independent descriptions of torture in the same prisons, and/or were corroborated by press
accounts, flight records, government documents, government officials, credible human rights

organizations, or fellow prisoners. In the three cases where there have not been specific
allegations of torture, Essam Hafez, Ihab Muhammad Saqr, and Jamil Qasim Saeed Muhammad, the
prisoners have not been released or heard from since they were rendered to a country that routinely uses
severe torture and is especially likely to use torture against suspected Islamic militants. This is also

true of the prisoners allegedly rendered to Uzbekistan. There are zero cases where a prisoner has
been released, or had contact with a family member, human rights worker, or other visitor, but
has not made any allegations of torture. If these cases are at all representative, the odds of torture after
a rendition seem closer to one hundred percent than fifty percent.

The administration would probably respond that these are individualized, fact-specific
determinations and it is unfair to judge them in the aggregate. This was what Attorney General
Gonzales argued during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on April 5, 2005, in response to
three separate questions from Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy about the reliability of
diplomatic assurances:
LEAHY: Do you think that the assurances we get from countries that are known to be torturers, when they say,
“Well, we won’t torture this person you’re sending back” -- do you really think those assurances are credible?
GONZALES: I think, Senator, that’s a difficult question that requires, sort of, a case-by-case analysis….
LEAHY: Do you think that Uzbekistan’s promise they will not torture detainees is trustworthy or even credible?
GONZALES: I think a country that would have that kind of record, we would have to receive some very special
assurances to satisfy ourselves in meeting our legal obligations….
LEAHY: I’m not sure that we really have standards. I mean, if our standards are to rely on their assurances they
won’t torture somebody, you really think, with some of the countries we send detainees to that, that’s an adequate
assurance?
GONZALES: Well, again, Senator, we take this obligation very, very seriously. And we know what are legal
obligations are. We know what the directive of the president is. And each case is very fact-specific.401
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There are two problems with this defense. First, it contradicts almost every news report and
CIA agent’s description of the current procedure for obtaining and evaluating diplomatic
assurances.402 According to the New York Times, shortly after September 11 the administration
authorized the CIA to carry out renditions without an individualized review of each prisoner’s
case by the White House, Department of State, or the Department of Justice.403 According to the
Washington Post, the CIA’s legal staff “requires the station chief in a given country to obtain a
verbal assurance from that country’s security service. The assurance must be cabled back to CIA
headquarters before a rendition takes place.”404 Assurances are accepted even in cases when
individual CIA agents have told reporters that “[y]ou would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe”
them,405 and that “[t]hey say they are not abusing them, and that satisfies the legal requirement,

but we all know they do.”406 There are only two reports of the United States’ deciding to stop
accepting a country’s assurances not to torture suspects, each described in only one news
article.407 One of these decisions was apparently reversed after September 11, and the other may
have had less to do with the country’s violations of its promises not to torture than escalating tensions
over other issues.408 If these reports are at all accurate, there is no “very fact-specific” “case-by-

case” analysis of “very special assurances” before the prisoner is blindfolded and taken onto the jet.
Second, as discussed in Section II(A), to comply in good faith with Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture, before rendering a prisoner the government must consider “all
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evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” including “[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights within the country of removal” and any “[o]ther relevant information regarding
conditions in the country of removal.”409 A country’s record of torturing terrorism suspects the
United States renders into its custody, in violation of its diplomatic assurances, is very strong “evidence
relevant to the possibility” that the same country will torture the next prisoner that the United States
renders into its custody in violation of its diplomatic assurances. If a “case-by-case analysis” means that
evidence of torture of other prisoners rendered to the same country is disregarded, it violates Article 3.

However, given the emphasis that Article 3 places on a country’s human rights record, it is
reasonable to do a country-by-country analysis of the danger of torture after a rendition, instead of
looking at all renditions to all countries in the aggregate.
In deciding whether country conditions compel the conclusion that an individual is more likely than
not to be tortured if returned, Circuit Courts give a great deal to the applicant’s membership in a group
that the state has a history of torturing, and the likelihood that the applicant will be imprisoned upon his
return. When a suspect is rendered to Egypt, Syria, or Uzbekistan, both these factors are present. The
suspect is certain to be detained and interrogated in a country that routinely tortures prisoners, and the
state has a history of murdering or torturing people in his exact situation.
In both Figueroa-Hincapie v. Fasano and Farah v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit held that the torture or
murder of two individuals who were similarly situated to the applicant compelled the conclusion that an
applicant was more likely than not to be tortured.410 For a detainee about to be rendered to Egypt, there
have been sixteen individuals who were almost identically situated to the prisoner: they were rendered by
the United States into Egyptian custody for detention and interrogation, and Egypt promised the United
States not to torture them. Fourteen of these sixteen have allegedly been tortured, and the two others have
been held incommunicado and may have been tortured. In all but two cases the allegations of torture are
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fairly detailed, and human rights groups have found them credible. Prisoners who were detained
separately, and in some cases detained years apart, have made very similar accusations about their
treatment.411 In two cases, it seems quite likely that the individual was returned to U.S. custody with
severe injuries resulting from torture. In at least six other cases, government documents or government
officials corroborate the torture allegations. Based on news reports and administration statements about
the rendition policy, the United States probably obtained diplomatic assurances from Egypt not to torture
the prisoner in every single one of these cases. These assurances do not seem to have reduced the risk of
torture at all.
There are two confirmed cases where the United States sent a prisoner to be interrogated in Syria, and
two other cases where a Canadian citizen traveled to Syria voluntarily and was arrested there, most likely
at the United States’ request. All four men were almost certainly tortured. Maher Arar has told the same
detailed, consistent story since he returned to Canada, and almost all aspects of it have now been
confirmed by independent sources. Both Arar and Muhammad Haydar Zammar seem to have been held in
nearly identical underground, grave-like cells in the Palestine Branch, and American officials’ statements
demonstrate that they knew or strongly suspected that both Arar and Zammar were being tortured.
Canadian government documents support Ahmad el-Maati’s allegations of torture, and based on Arar’s
and his family members’ reports Abdullah Almalki was beaten much more severely than the other two
Canadians. The United States may not have obtained diplomatic assurances about Almalki’s or el-Maati’s
treatment since they were detained overseas, but it very likely did in Zammar’s case and certainly did in
Arar’s. Those assurances proved worthless.
None of the prisoners rendered to Uzbekistan has been identified by name or released, but the State
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Department human rights reports demonstrate that torture is extremely common and extremely brutal in
Uzbek prisons, and that those suspected of Islamic extremism are singled out for the harshest treatment.
The State Department reports record six different instances of members of the Islamic organization Hizb
ut-Tahrir being tortured to death in the past few years, and indicate that the real number may be
significantly higher. There were many other cases of torture that was very severe but not fatal. There is no
reason to believe that a prisoner rendered to Uzbekistan by the United States, accused not only of
possessing banned pamphlets but of participation in violent Islamist terrorism, would be treated any less
brutally. Obtaining assurances from Uzbekistan that it will not torture prisoners will do nothing to change
this. If the Karimov regime’s record of torture were not enough to undermine the value of its diplomatic
assurances, its record of blatant falsification of medical reports would suffice. No rational person could
rely in good faith on promises not to torture from the regime that attributed Emin Usman’s and Shovruk
Ruzimuradov’s deaths to suicide, Ravshon Haitov’s death to a heart attack, Mirzakomil Avazov’s and
Khusnuddin Olimov’s deaths to a tea fight, and Orif Ershanov’s death to high blood pressure.

The evidence, which Article 3 forbids the administration from ignoring, compels the conclusion
that a suspect is more likely than not to be tortured after every rendition to Egypt, Syria, or
Uzbekistan. No reasonable factfinder could determine that unverified promises not to torture,
which those countries have violated in the past and which many CIA officers say are worthless, reduce
the odds of torture to less than fifty percent.

In the case of rendition to Jordan and Morocco, there is not yet enough publicly available
evidence to compel the conclusion that a suspect is more likely than not to be tortured after a rendition.

There is only one publicly known case of rendition to each country. In Jordan the prisoner has
not been released and there is some possibiblity that he is being held in CIA custody rather than
being rendered; in Morocco the prisoner’s allegations of torture have not been corroborated as
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thoroughly as in some other cases. And while both countries’ intelligence services torture
prisoners, the State Department reports portray their use of torture as less pervasive and less brutal
than Egypt’s, Syria’s, or Uzbekistan’s.
But while the publicly available evidence does not compel the conclusion that every suspect
rendered to Morocco or Jordan is more likely than not to be tortured, the administration has
access to much more information than the public. If Benyam Muhammad’s story is true, U.S.
soldiers or intelligence personnel have seen and photographed the injury to his chest and genitals

received in a Moroccan jail. The administration probably knows where Jamil Qasim Saeed
Muhammad is being imprisoned, and may know whether he has been mistreated. It also knows
which other prisoners have been rendered to Morocco and Jordan, and may know whether they have
returned to U.S. custody with injuries or made credible allegations of torture.
Again, Article 3 of the CAT requires the administration to consider all this evidence before deciding
to transfer a prisoner. Combined with the evidence that unverified diplomatic assurances from countries
known to torture prisoners do almost nothing to reduce the risk of torture, it may very well

demonstrate that any prisoner rendered to Morocco or Jordan for interrogation is more likely
than not to be tortured. If so, transferring prisoners to those countries violates the Convention
Against Torture and FARRA.
All of this is true whether or not Maher Arar’s lawsuit is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
lack of a cause of action, lack of standing, or to protect state secrets. It is true whether or not any
judge ever rules that it is true. The U.S. Constitution states that “all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”412 It also states
that the President “shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”413 The executive branch has an
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obligation to obey the Convention Against Torture, FARRA, and the Anti-Torture Statute even if no court
has the power to force the executive to obey or penalize it for disobedience. The limits that Congress

places on the courts’ authority to enforce Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and
FARRA do not limit the executive’s obligation to comply with those laws in good faith.
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